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Local law enforcement is a necessary and irreplaceable component to a comprehensive 
approach to increasing the probability of detection of attempted Nuclear and Radiological 
Terrorism incidents. Local law enforcement’s unique knowledge, skills, and abilities 
provide investigative, protection, and direct action capabilities not found in other 
nonmilitary disciplines. A well- trained, equipped, and situational aware Law 
Enforcement community can form our nation’s last, best defense against this terrorist 
threat. This thesis will examine the broad policy options for law enforcement agencies 
pursuing a Preventive Radiological Nuclear Detection (PRND) program. The 
examination will look at four options: (1) taking no action and leaving the PRND mission 
to federal agencies, (2) a single agency approach, (3) multiple law enforcement agencies 
creating a regional PRND program and (4) a multidisciplinary, multiagency approach 
covering a large urban area. Each option will use a case to illustrate the comparative 
aspects of planning, organization, equipment, training, exercising, and operations 
support. It will be shown that interested law enforcement agencies can choose and 
implement a PRND that meets their needs as part of an overall homeland security 
program in their respective jurisdiction. The goal is to encourage more law enforcement 
agencies to participate in the domestic portion of a global strategy known as the Global 
Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA). This document will serve as a roadmap for 









































Robert Forrest, my second reader, passed away suddenly on August 28th, 2012 
while vacationing with his family on the Outer Banks of North Carolina, at the age of 46. 
Second Reader is a title that does not give full justice to Rob’s role in this thesis or my 
life. Rob served as a mentor and friend for the past decade. This thesis is interwoven with 
his shared drive and commitment of making our nation safer from the threat of 
radiological and nuclear terrorism. Rob gave freely of his nights and weekends too many 
times to count, to train a generation of law enforcement officers in the Preventive 
Radiological Nuclear Detection mission. As a recognized leader in the Health Physics 
community, he actively assisted the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, The Departments 
of Energy and Homeland Security, as well as several of the National Laboratories on 
matters of national security regarding this complex threat. He traveled the world assisting 
in prevention efforts in modern and developing countries alike to help secure materials 
that could be used as weapons and raise awareness to the threat. Domestically, he served 
as a role model for private sector involvement in the Global Nuclear Detection 
Architecture and has touched many of the programs in the Global Threat Reduction 
Initiative and others under the direction of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, too 
numerous to list. 
I take great solace that Rob died in the company of his family, in a place he 
enjoyed far from the many fronts in our nation’s war on terrorism. Rob wasn’t a 
uniformed soldier or sailor in the fight, but his contributions were significant and his 
family, friends, and colleagues should remember him proudly. 
It is my sincere desire that this document serve as a lasting tribute to Rob for his 
friendship and support on our shared journey; and a testament to his commitment in 
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I. HUNTING A BLACK SWAN: POLICY OPTIONS FOR 
AMERICA’S POLICE IN PREVENTING 
RADIOLOGICAL/NUCLEAR TERRORISM1 
Saturday, August 18, 2012 at 2:35 am 
Suburban location—Anywhere, United States 
Three men enter a darkened building of a mid-size university closed for summer 
break. The university has unarmed security guards that make periodic checks of the 
campus building exteriors, and the local law enforcement agency is a county police 
department that interacts with the university on an “occasional” basis. The men enter a 
third floor laboratory housing a Cesium 137 irradiator. The irradiator is used by faculty 
and students to expose tissue samples to high levels of radiation during their research. 
Using simple tools, they partially dismantle the device and remove the radioactive source 
capsule containing 3,000 curies of Cesium 137. The three perpetrators move the material 
in a crudely constructed lead bucket providing light shielding and minimal protection to 
them, placing the material in a self storage locker ten miles away. The theft goes 
unnoticed until Monday morning when it is reported to the county police. The county 
police are not immediately concerned or recognize the significance this type of theft or 
the amount of radioactive material taken. 
Monday, August 21, 2012 at 10:45 am 
Urban location—Anywhere, United States 
 The three perpetrators, over the previous two days, have taken the radioactive 
material and assembled it with explosives stolen from a construction site into a 
Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD), commonly called a “dirty bomb.” The device has 
been transported to a medium-sized city, one hundred miles from the university. All three 
men are suffering from radiation sickness but are able to detonate the device in the city’s 
business and financial district. Seven people, in addition to the three terrorists, are killed 
                                                 
1 This chapter serves as a “stand-alone” overview or executive summary of law enforcement's role in 





in the explosion. The resulting contamination from the dispersal of the Cesium 137 will 
likely produce a public health concern and general panic, as well as significant financial 
consequences.2  
 The above scenario is fictional but will serve as an introduction to the discussion 
of what could have been done to deter or interdict the attack. Could the university and 
local police have had strategies to better secure the radioactive materials that were stolen? 
Could the local police been notified in a more timely manner through a closer working 
relationship with university radiation safety professionals? Could police have searched 
for the material after it been stolen, while in transit and assembly at self storage facility, 
or while in route to the final target?  
The answer to all of these questions is, yes. A number of police agencies, of every 
size and composition, have undertaken a new mission known as Preventive Radiological / 
Nuclear Detection (PRND)3 as part of their jurisdiction’s homeland security strategy. 
These PRND efforts interface with the international effort to prevent nuclear and 
radiological terrorism known as the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA).  
Since September 11, 2001, American policing has undergone a fundamental 
transformation. Traditional crime fighting and the public service mission have been 
expanded to include roles in the homeland security enterprise. Matters once thought to be 
squarely within the domain of the United States Government as part of national security 
have become commonplace at the local level. The area of nuclear and radiological 
terrorism prevention is an example of this transformation. Most law enforcement officers 
who began their careers prior to 9/11 would never have envisioned an expanded role in 
this area, let alone carrying radiation detection equipment as part of their normal patrol 
duties. An attack of this nature is truly a “black swan” by definition—an extremely 
remote possibility but with staggeringly high consequences. The successful detonation of 
a nuclear weapon within the United States today would change our country on a 
                                                 
2 Estimates vary but several hundreds of millions of dollars is possible. A Los Angeles study is 
presented later in the thesis for a similar device causing sixteen billion dollars of effect.  
3 PRND is the term used by DNDO to describe the community of agencies, law enforcement and 




unimaginable scale. A lesser impact would result from the use of a radiological dispersal 
device or RDD, but even that could cost billions to clean up and years from which to 
recover.  
The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture attempts to create a multi-pronged 
“defense in-depth” strategy that increases the probability of detection and causes a 
deterrent effect forcing a potential adversary to reconsider if such an attack is likely to 
succeed. This thesis posits that law enforcement adds a distinctive, if not the last, layer of 
this worldwide effort. By harnessing law enforcement’s unique blend of familiar crime 
fighting, community policing, and terrorism response skills, they add greatly to the 
domestic front of nuclear and radiation terrorism prevention.  
The examination of law enforcement’s role in PRND leads to this thesis and the 
following research questions: 
• For law enforcement agencies considering becoming involved in an 
expanded homeland security role, what are the major policy options for 
implementing and operating a Preventive Nuclear/Radiological Detection 
(PRND) Program? 
 
• What are the costs involved in starting and maintaining the various policy 
options?  
 
• What are the relative factors in the program's management concerning 
planning, organization, equipment, training, exercises, and operations 
support that make each option unique? 
It has been debated whether radiological and nuclear terrorism is a viable concern 
for our nation’s homeland security efforts.4 It is certain that a successful attack5 would 
cause significant impact—a nuclear device would likely cause mass causalities, and a 
radiological dispersal device (RDD), sometimes referred to as a “dirty bomb” may cause 
widespread economic damage due to contamination as seen in the opening scenario. This  
 
                                                 
4 A more thorough examination is contained in Chapter II’s Literature Review Section. 





thesis will argue that due to the significance of the consequences, preventive strategies, 
such as the GNDA, are appropriate and the law enforcement agencies play a critical role 
in its domestic portion.  
In this type of terrorism prevention, the main focus revolves around increasing the 
probability of detection of the theft, illegal movement, or attempts to utilize radiological 
or nuclear material as a weapon. The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) is 
the current United States Government (USG) strategy to increase this probability of 
detection concept thus creating a layered global and national defense framework.6 The 
GNDA is a network of equipment, personnel, and information technologies that are 
designed to prevent a terrorist organization from obtaining, transporting, and deploying a 
nuclear or radioactive material-based weapon into the United States. Utilizing existing 
local law enforcement as the domestic portion of the GNDA is an effective strategy, as it 
harnesses their ingrained crime prevention mission and advances it with added training 
and technology.  
The role of law enforcement is concentrated in the interior portion of the GNDA. 
Police are assigned throughout the nation in an ever-present and steadfast deployment 
mode. The concept that can benefit the GNDA is that law enforcement officers are 
generally available twenty-four hours a day, every day and although rural areas may 
experience reduced response times, there is still a responsible jurisdiction for every 
geographic area. This gives a program like the GNDA a physical advantage by utilizing 
police that are on patrol. With additional training, equipment, and procedures related to 
the GNDA, police officers could seamlessly mesh their existing duties with 
counterterrorism, thus alleviating the expense of dedicated detection personnel.  
Law enforcement officers possess skills that make their inclusion in Preventive 
Radiological Nuclear Detection (PRND) efforts desirable. These include: 
Situational Awareness: No one is more familiar with his or her respective 
community then the patrol officers responsible for its protection on a daily basis. These 
                                                 




officers are trained and positioned to notice when conditions change and detect 
suspicious behavior. They are naturally inquisitive to situations, persons, and other 
activities, which do not fit the usual patterns in a given area. This skill is developed and 
honed over the course of a career and is extremely difficult to duplicate with an 
individual encountering an area for the first time, particularly during an actual event. 
Interview/Interrogation Skills: Police officers spend most of their time interacting 
with the public, e.g., criminal suspects, victims, witnesses, and the general population. 
With this interaction, they develop a sense of when a person is being truthful or 
deceptive. They make quick and efficient size-ups in the first few seconds of any 
interaction. This is a basic survival skill that like situational awareness is honed over the 
course of time and continues to improve and evolve.  
Detention and Arrest Authority: Most nonlaw enforcement participants in the 
GNDA do not possess the statutory authority to stop, question, detain, and arrest 
individuals. This is a critical component when considering that the primary goal is not 
merely to find radioactive and nuclear material but to also stop individuals from using 
such product as a weapon. Any person can be trained to use instruments to locate these 
substances, but having the legal ability to engage perpetrators without hesitation is 
fundamental.  
Use of Force: It cannot be stated strongly enough that the goal of preventing 
radiological and nuclear terrorism is to identify and locate the persons responsible and 
recover all illicit materials being used. In simplest terms, it is reasonable to assume that 
there will be persons present with the materials that will not willingly surrender it. As 
explained in the arrest/detention section, the ability to actually stop the incident from 
occurring is the focus. This requires being able to properly and effectively utilize force, 






There are four broad Preventive Radiological Nuclear Detection Operations 
(PRND) mission types that law enforcement agencies can perform. The four missions7 
are: 
• Radiological Material and Site Protection / Response: Law enforcement 
can assist in the security of known locations where radiological and 
nuclear materials are stored or used. 
• Steady State: 24/7 deployment of detection equipment by patrol personnel. 
• Special Event / Enhanced Steady State: Adding PRND personnel to the 
security of special events from National Security Special Events to local 
venues. 
• Surge / Intelligence Driven: Deploying PRND personnel based on Threat 
Information 
• Within each of the above are three common mission activities: 
• Primary Screening: Making “first detection” or contact with a radioactive 
material. Under either innocent or illicit circumstances. 
• Secondary Screening: Determine if the material detected is innocent or 
illicit in nature. 
• Technical Reach-Back: Receiving assistance from federal authorities 
including the FBI and National Laboratories to make a final determination 
of the materials use or threat. 
There are applications for the entire mission and activities listed above in the 
opening terrorism scenario. Trained and equipped law enforcement officers may have had 
several opportunities to detect and interdict the attack pathway depicted that will become 
evident. Before beginning PRND operations, a law enforcement agency must choose a 
policy option under which to operate their program.  
This research examines four policy options:  
• No Local Action – PRND is solely a federal responsibility 
• Single Agency PRND Program 
• Multi-Agency PRND Program 
• Multi-Agency / Multi-Discipline PRND Programs 
                                                 




Each of the four PRND policy models will be presented as a case study using an 
actual department’s program, with an overview. They will then proceed through six 
POETE/Ops factors taken from the DHS-DNDO Program Management Handbook. The 
factors are: 
1. Planning- Develop a program strategy, begin and manage a PRND 
Program.8   
 
2. Organization- Organizational Design and Staffing a PRND Program.9 
 
3. Equipment- Selection, Acquisition, and Maintenance.10 
 
4. Training- Develop, Establish, and Manage program Training. 11 
 
5. Exercises- Develop, Establish, and Manage program Exercises.12 
 
6. Operations Support- Technical Reach-back and Information Sharing 
Support including from federal assets.13  
 
A matrix will follow in Chapter V depicting the relative strengths and weaknesses 
of each option. Assessment criteria include NIMS typing, training costs, equipment and 
sustainment costs, and an overall program ranking. The final program rank is scaled 
using a Limited, Good, Better, Best format and includes supporting text descriptions.  
Below are the general descriptions of each program model found in Chapter III: 
 No Local Action—PRND is a Federal Responsibility 
This represents no local action on part of nonfederal law enforcement agencies. 
An agency, after reviewing threat information, decides not to create a PRND program 
due to actual or perceived barriers such as funding. Their conclusion is that the GNDA 
                                                 
8 (DHS-DNDO Program Handbook) Planning 1. 
9 Ibid., Organization 1. 
10 Ibid., Equipment 1. 
11 Ibid., Training 1. 
12 Ibid., Exercises 1. 




effort is not in the purview of local law enforcement and remains within the sphere of 
United States Government (USG) agencies in the national security arena. The 
Transportation Security Administration’s Visible Intermodal Protection and Response 
Team (TSA VIPR) is used as the case study for this program. 
 Embarking Alone—Single Law Enforcement Agency Program 
This is a program that includes only the originating law enforcement agency. This 
is the first step in a progressive program that begins with training and equipping a limited 
number of personnel. The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department is used as the case 
study for analysis in Chapter IV. 
 Working with Law Enforcement Peers—Multi-Agency Law Enforcement 
Program 
This involves the originating agency and surrounding law enforcement entities 
working in a cooperative program to provide wider prevention coverage. An example 
would be multiple police departments working together in an Urban Area Security 
Initiative (UASI) region. The Philadelphia Police Department’s involvement in the 
Philadelphia UASI PRND program will be used as the case study for this program. 
Working with all Response Partners—Multi-Discipline/Multi-Agency PRND 
Program 
This requires the participation of a number of agencies from several geographic 
jurisdictions and from one or more additional public safety agencies such as Fire, EMS, 
Public Health, as well as state and private sector radiological professionals. This program 
option combines the inherent strengths of law enforcement in counterterrorism programs 
with the technical expertise and response capabilities of other first responders. The 
Suffolk County Police Department’s involvement in the “Securing the Cities”14 initiative 
will be used as the case study for this program. 
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Tables 1 and 2 provide a snapshot of the results of the analysis in Chapter IV. 
Then results are elaborated in the Findings Section of Chapter VI: 
Table 1.   Analysis Matrix (POETE-Ops) 
Program 




PRND LIMITED LIMITED LIMITED LIMITED LIMITED BEST 
Single 
Agency GOOD GOOD BEST GOOD GOOD BEST 
Multi-























PRND VARIES VARIES VARIES LIMITED YES LIMITED
Single 
Agency $1,755,000 $274,500 $86,000 YES YES GOOD 
Multi-





$1,639,000 $1,350,000 $102,900 YES YES BEST 
 
There are expenses associated with this effort. In terms of personnel, training, 
procuring equipment and sustainment, costs can be substantial. Some agencies may find 
their involvement cost prohibitive and choose to leave the mission to federal authorities. 
Economic hardships and competing attention with more traditional crime prevention and 
response duties will tax some agencies to the point where this additional duty is not 
practical. Others will choose a policy option presented here and join the PRND effort at a 
time appropriate for their agency. Programs will vary in size and scope. However, every 
case study presented is scalable. Larger agencies and their programs were used as 
examples but the management criteria apply to departments of every geographical and 
personnel size. The principle missions—Steady—State, Enhanced Steady State/Special 
Event, and Intelligence-Driven search operations, are found in every community in 
varying degrees. The knowledge that such operations exist at the federal level may 
merely raise awareness in some departments. They can, in turn, at least plan for basic 





Law enforcement agencies, including some used as case studies in this thesis, 
decided to embrace this mission and added to the layered defense and protection of our 
nation as envisioned by the GNDA. Increasing police participation only heightens the 
probability of detection and enhances all of law enforcement's roles in homeland security 
and defense.  
Agencies are strongly encouraged to educate their personnel on the reality of 
radiological and nuclear threats, locate and liaise with sites and organizations that store 
and use radioactive material, and assist in the physical security and response to those 
sites. They must also partner with organizations actively pursuing the PRND mission to 
provide an ever increasing blanket of overlapping detection and deterrent capability. This 
recommended strategy is expressed as PREPARE, PROTECT, PARTNER, and 
PROVIDE. 
A. PREPARE 
The first step is to make the decision that it worthwhile for the law enforcement 
agency to engage in PRND efforts. This can take several forms and does not necessarily 
entail creating a formal PRND program. Many agencies begin at the preparation step and 
logically grow as funding and capabilities expand. 
An agency can begin by educating its employees about the threat of nuclear and 
radiological terrorism. There are a number of web-based training courses that can be 
accessed on FEMA’s website (www.fema.gov) that cover awareness level material. The 
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is in the process of creating training products aimed 
at executive leaders and elected officials in a similar focus. If the majority of law 
enforcement officers took as little as two hours to educate themselves on the threat, 
became more aware of the materials that are used and transported within and around their 
communities, it would increase the probability of detection and enhance the deterrence 
factor without purchasing any equipment.  
The next step would be for an agency to locate and develop a relationship with 




These include hospitals, universities, industrial sites, government laboratories, power 
generating stations, and waste facilities. It is advantageous to have an existing 
relationship and discuss mutual concerns such as emergency response to the site before to 
an incident occurs. Patrol officers making random unscheduled visits to these sites can 
discourage the “insider” threat discussed in the background section. If employees see 
there is a strong relationship between law enforcement and their organization, they may 
be encouraged to share intelligence and information, and be deterred from becoming 
involved in a terrorism event. Similar to awareness training, the relationship component 
is cost neutral and can singularly increase the strategic goals of the GNDA.  
B. PROTECT 
Once the education and liaison steps are fulfilled, the path continues to site and 
community. The National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Global Threat 
Reduction Initiative (GTRI) seeks to add voluntary, government funded, security 
upgrades to physical locations that store and use radioactive materials that could be used 
to make a radiological dispersal device (RDD). The most common type of sites involved 
in the program are hospitals with Cesium or Cobalt blood irradiators. The GTRI program 
also provides training and equipment, such as personal radiation detectors (PRDs), to 
local law enforcement agencies that are responsibility for protection and response to a 
site. The program also provides training on the use of PRDs, as well as a three-year 
maintenance, calibration, and sustainment program to offset costs to the agency. Several 
programs evaluated in this document benefited greatly from this initiative and built their 
capability by being involved in NNSA’s effort to secure sites across the nation. Agencies 
are strongly encouraged to explore this as an option to begin or augment their PRND 
efforts. 
C. PARTNER 
Collaboration is cited throughout the homeland security enterprise as critical and 
is equally important in the Preventive Radiological / Nuclear Detection (PRND) program 




risk sites in their patrol areas begins the process of partnering. It is further enhanced by 
inclusion in the GTRI program if available in the respective jurisdiction. If not, agencies 
should consider initiating a smaller effort—a NIMS Type IV15 or nontyped operation by 
placing several PRDs in the hands of patrol personnel. By establishing a relationship with 
other response agencies, such as fire, hazardous materials, radiation safety professionals, 
or the National Guard Civil Support Team, a program can expand through the 
collaboration and costs spread across several budgets. The NIMS Typing information in 
Appendix C provides more information on joint multi-disciplinary PRND teams. It is 
stressed throughout this thesis that law enforcement's openness to collaboration is critical 
and inclusion in existing nonlaw enforcement efforts can be a powerful force multiplier. 
If equipment cannot be acquired due to funding or other constraints, agencies should 
strongly consider providing personnel to existing detection efforts implemented by other 
organizations to add the interviewing/interrogation, arrest/detention, and use of force 
expertise not indigenous to other disciplines. This again represents a low or no cost 
option for inclusion in nationwide PRND efforts and benefits all the agencies involved.  
D. PROVIDE 
By educating its personnel, partnering with other public and private organizations, 
and arming its staff with detection and interdiction equipment, law enforcement provides 
another layer of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. The GNDA begins overseas 
by protecting sites in foreign countries storing at-risk material, then protects our borders 
by scanning cargo at foreign ports and domestic border crossings, but truly ends in the 
realm of America’s police whose inclusion provides a unique blend of traditional crime 
fighting with a role in national security. 
Agencies should strongly consider examining the PRND programs detailed in this 
document to find a starting point to begin involvement in the prevention of nuclear and 
radiation terrorism. The first three steps can be adjusted as funding and personnel 
resources are available. Note that not every agency needs to develop a NIMS Type I 
                                                 





PRND operation. Substantial financial resources support several programs contained 
herein and most jurisdictions do not have access to that level of homeland security 
funding. All agencies can participate whether in awareness training or building 
relationships with existing stakeholders. 
America’s police have a long and proud history of protecting its communities and 
citizenry. It transformed itself in the wake of the tragedy of September 11 and rose to the 
new mission of terrorism prevention, as well as crime related and public safety duties. Its 
members significantly contribute to the PRND mission and fill a critical function in the 
GNDA. By taking an active role in these operations, they may very well prevent the most 
horrific attack that our nation has ever endured. Law enforcement officers serve as 

















II. THE ROLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN NUCLEAR AND 
RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS: DEFINING THE ROLE OF LAW 
ENFORCEMENT IN NUCLEAR/RADIATION DETECTION 
For law enforcement agencies considering becoming involved in an expanded 
homeland security role, what are the major policy options for implementing and 
operating a Preventive Nuclear/Radiological Detection (PRND) Program? What are the 
costs involved in starting and maintaining the various policy options? What are the 
relative factors in the program's management concerning planning, organization, 
equipment, training, exercises, and operations support that make each option unique? 
B. PROBLEM SPACE: RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM 
PREVENTION  
1. Radiological/Nuclear Threats and Prevention Efforts by Law 
Enforcement  
Nonfederal law enforcement agencies have a critical role in the larger 
international effort to prevent nuclear/radiological terrorism. The research will describe 
four program options that agencies could consider in expanding their counterterrorism 
efforts to include Preventive Radiological/Nuclear Detection (PRND). It shall present the 
advantages and disadvantages of each policy model using case studies to further illustrate 
each option. 
The reality of a nuclear or radiological-based terrorist attack in the United States 
may be remote.16 However, the consequences of an attack are likely to cause significant 
repercussions in terms of physical and economic costs, public fear and a perception that 
our adversary has the ability to deploy weapons of mass destruction at the time and 
location of their choosing. A recent study on a Radiological Dispersal Device, also 
known as “Dirty Bomb,” in the Los Angeles area estimated the economic impact in 
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excess of $16 billion dollars.17 The attack in that study caused 180 fatalities, 270 injuries 
and contaminated 36 square city blocks of downtown Los Angeles but had lingering 
economic and psychological effects for years beyond.18 Low probability, high impact 
terrorism scenarios such as this illustrate the need for deterrence and prevention 
initiatives at all levels of government both internationally and domestically. This 
discussion will focus on the domestic portion of an overall international prevention effort 
and advocate a significant role for law enforcement. In prevention, a main focus revolves 
around increasing the probability of detection of the theft, illegal movement, or attempts 
to utilize radiological or nuclear material as a weapon. The Global Nuclear Detection 
Architecture (GNDA) is the current United States Government (USG) strategy to 
increase this probability of detection concept thus creating a layered global and national 
defense framework.19 
The GNDA is a network of equipment, personnel, and information technologies 
that are designed to prevent a terrorist organization from obtaining, transporting, and 
deploying a nuclear or radioactive material-based weapon into the United States. Two 
National Planning Scenarios center on these types of attacks—Scenario #1 analyses an 
event with an Improvised Nuclear Device and Scenario # 11 depicts an event with a 
Radiological Dispersal Device.20 The GNDA begins with our government paying to 
secure sites in the former Soviet Union and ends domestically with a police officer armed 
with a radiation detector at the gates to the Super Bowl, World Series, or during routine 
patrol. Utilizing existing local law enforcement as the domestic portion of the GNDA is 
an effective strategy, as it harnesses their ingrained crime prevention mission and 
expands upon it with added training and technology.  
The keystone of the domestic strategy is that law enforcement agencies must add 
a PRND program to their homeland security/counterterrorism deployment that meets 
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their respective jurisdiction’s ability and is flexible and scalable as partners and resources 
become available. Law enforcement has a unique role as the last, best defense in the 
GNDA chain, and its capabilities have yet to be fully studied in this arena. This 
examination will strive to explore this topic in an organized, intelligent fashion to support 
a position of expanding law enforcement’s participation in the GNDA objective by 
providing a policy option pathway for implementing and maintaining a Preventive 
Radiological / Nuclear Detection (PRND) Program. 
The next section will outline the ideas of deterrence and increasing the probability 
of detection, as they are the foundations of the current GNDA strategy. It expands upon 
the GNDA concept, its objectives, and component parts in an effort to strengthen the 
argument that law enforcement plays a vital role in its domestic expansion. By 
understanding the theory and application of the GNDA, an agency can be better prepared 
to make an informed decision on committing personnel and resources to this effort. 
2. Prevention Efforts by Law Enforcement 
a. General Deterrence and Increasing Probability of Detection 
Law enforcement’s primary role is prevention. It provides a perception 
that a particular area is safe from crime and instills in potential criminals a fear of being 
caught in the course of an illegal act. The same prevention and deterrence used in 
traditional policing efforts can be used in the effort against radiological and nuclear 
threats. Police add a valuable layer to the GNDA and assist in providing a deterrent 
worldwide. The deterrence factor is coupled with proactive security operations that 
increase the probability of actual detection of the radioactive or nuclear material, as well 
as other destructive devices constructed with these materials.  
One of the prevailing goals in preventing nuclear and radiological 
terrorism is to increase the chance that those involved or the material involved will be 
interdicted before act completion or misuse.21 One way to accomplish this is through a 
“defense in depth” approach where multiple layers of detection capability are deployed 
                                                 




between the individuals and the actions. The Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) describes the numerous layers employed at airports throughout the nation for the 
safety of the travelling public. Below is a graphic representation of the TSA strategy.22 
The concept illustrates that an adversary may be detected, deterred, or interdicted by 
anyone or any combination of layers. A successful attack would have to defeat all layers 
and an adversary would be uncertain exactly how many layers they would encounter in 
any given attempt. 
 
Figure 1.   Layers of Airport Security (From TSA Website) 
A similar multi-layered effort is being implemented on a worldwide scale 
by the United States and partner nations to intercept nuclear and radiological materials 
from misuse and apprehend those responsible. It is known as the Global Nuclear 
                                                 




Detection Architecture. The remainder of this thesis will primarily discuss domestic law 
enforcement options for participating in this effort. 
The GNDA mirrors the TSA approach by instituting a number of layers, 
thus increasing the probability of detection and interdiction. It also serves as a deterrent 
to aspiring terrorists in that they have no idea how many detection layers they will 
encounter, or where they will encounter detection assets. In preventing radiological and 
nuclear terrorism, increasing the number of layers both internationally and domestically 
improves both the probability of detection/interdiction and strengthens the deterrent value 
by forcing an adversary to overestimate the chances of success based on random 
countermeasures embedded in the domestic layers. Law enforcement officers equipped 
with detection equipment can very well serve as the last layer in preventing a nuclear or 
radiological event. 
b. The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA)23 
The current strategy for preventing the illegal movement and detection of 
unauthorized nuclear and radiological materials is known as the Global Nuclear 
Detection Architecture. This is a multi-layered approach to detecting and interdicting 
terrorists or materials attempting to enter the United States. Before defining the role of 
law enforcement in the GNDA, it is important to discuss its definition and overall 
objectivities. The GNDA is described as a “whole of government”24 approach because it 
involves components from various entities, such as the Department of Homeland 
Security, including its Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and the Departments 
of Justice, State, Defense, and Energy. 
The 2010 Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Strategic Plan defines the 
GNDA as: 
... a worldwide network of sensors, telecommunications, and personnel, 
with the supporting information exchanges, programs, and protocols that 
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serve to detect, analyze, and report on nuclear and radiological materials 
that are out of regulatory control. The term “out of regulatory control” 
refers to materials that are being imported, possessed, stored, transported, 
developed, or used without authorization by the appropriate regulatory 
authority, either inadvertently or deliberately. 25 
There are four layers to the GNDA26 consisting of: 
• Exterior layer, including foreign countries and USG international 
activities;  
• Trans-border layer, including transit to the U.S. and the U.S. 
border;  
• Interior layer, including the domestic U.S. but excluding the 
border; and  
• Cross-cutting efforts, including activities that apply across or to all 
geographic layers. 
The first layer does not involve local level law enforcement agencies and 
is international in its focus. One example of this international layer is the Megaports 
initiative, “which aims to strengthen the capability of foreign governments to deter, 
detect, and interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials transiting 
the global maritime shipping system.” The Megaports Initiative seeks to equip 100 
seaports with radiation detection systems by 2015, scanning approximately 50 percent of 
global maritime containerized cargo.”27 
The second layer relates to ederal law enforcement agencies, including the 
Coast Guard and Customs, which monitor and secure our international borders. The TSA 
also plays a role in the GNDA because any airport that accepts international flights is part 
of our country's borders. The Coast Guard, Customs and Border Patrol, and TSA all 
deploy personnel with radiation detection equipment across land borders, seaports and 
commercial aviation pathways. 
                                                 
25 (White House, 2005), 6. 
26 Ibid., 7. 




The third layer concerns the interior security of the U.S. where local law 
enforcement agencies can provide a critical component to the GNDA. Other public safety 
agencies play a role in the interior including Fire and EMS Departments, as well as State 
Health and Radiation Control Programs. This discussion will focus on law enforcement 
as it is the discipline that can take interdiction actions after material is detected and while 
threat conditions exist.  
Figure 2 shows the first three layers as described above. 
 
Figure 2.   Domestic Portion of GNDA (May 2010 DNDO Briefing) 
The final layer is designed to reinforce DNDO's mission to integrate these 
layers from separate international, border, and interior initiatives in a collaborative effort 
that supports all GNDA efforts. 
The next section will examine the role law enforcement can play in the 





c. Law Enforcement as the Domestic Portion of GNDA 
The role of law enforcement is concentrated in the interior portion of the 
GNDA. Police are assigned throughout the nation in an ever-present deployment mode. 
The concept that can benefit the GNDA is that law enforcement officers are generally 
available twenty-four hours a day, every day and although rural areas may experience 
reduced response times, there is still a responsible jurisdiction for every geographic area. 
This gives a program like the GNDA a physical advantage by utilizing police that are on 
patrol. With additional training, equipment, and procedures related to the GNDA, police 
officers could seamlessly mesh their existing duties with counterterrorism, thus 
alleviating the expense of a dedicated detection personnel.  
The largest single law enforcement program involved in the GNDA is the 
“Securing the Cities” (STC) Initiative based in New York City. The program provides 
detection equipment and training to law enforcement agencies in New York, New Jersey, 
and Connecticut. The 2011 Progress Report on 9/11 Recommendations states, “Through 
STC, nearly 11,000 personnel in the New York City region have been trained in 
preventive radiological and nuclear detection operations and nearly 6,000 pieces of 
radiological detection equipment have been deployed. In April 2011, DNDO and the New 
York Police Department sponsored a full-scale exercise for radiological and nuclear 
detection capabilities in the New York City region to assess the ability of STC partners to 
detect radiological and nuclear materials and deploy personnel, equipment and special 
units in accordance with established protocols and in response to threat-based 
intelligence.”28 In its 2012 budget proposal, DHS proposed expanding the Securing the 
Cities (STC) initiative, designed to enhance the nation‘s ability to detect and prevent a 
radiological or nuclear attack in the highest risk cities, to include additional urban areas 
while continuing to support efforts in New York.29  
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There are four broad mission categories for law enforcement agencies 
involved in Preventive Radiological Nuclear Detection Operations (PRND). 30 The four 
missions31 are: 
• Radiological Material and Site Protection / Response: Law enforcement 
can assist in the security of known locations where radiological and 
nuclear materials are stored or used. 
• Steady State: 24/7 deployment of detection equipment by patrol personnel. 
• Special Event / Enhanced Steady State: Adding PRND personnel to the 
security of special events from National Security Special Events to local 
venues. 
• Surge / Intelligence Driven: Deploying PRND personnel based on threat 
information 
Within each of the above are three common mission activities: 
• Primary Screening: Making “first detection” or contact with a radioactive 
material. May be either innocent or illicit. 
• Secondary Screening: Determine if the material detected is innocent or 
illicit in nature. 
• Technical Reach-Back: Receiving assistance from federal authorities 
including the FBI and National Laboratories to make a final determination 
of the materials use or threat. 
The following illustrates the existing skills and traits possessed by police 
officers, which supports an assertion that law enforcement can make a valuable 
contribution to the GNDA effort. 
d. Relevant Law Enforcement Skill Set 
Many disciplines including first responders (Fire and Emergency Medical 
Services), traditional radiation safety professionals, and the military have a role in the  
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Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA). Law enforcement officers possess skills 
that make their inclusion in Preventive Radiological Nuclear Detection (PRND) efforts 
desirable. These include: 
Situational Awareness: No one is more familiar with his or her respective 
communities than the patrol officers responsible for its protection on a daily basis. These 
officers are trained, and in a position, to take notice when conditions change and/or detect 
suspicious behavior. They are naturally inquisitive to situations, persons, and other 
activities, which do not fit the usual patterns in a given area. This skill is developed and 
honed over the course of a career and is extremely difficult to duplicate with an 
individual encountering an area for the first time, particularly during an actual event. 
Interview/Interrogation Skills: Police officers spend most of their time 
interacting with the public, e.g., criminal suspects, victims, witnesses, and the general 
population. They develop a sense of when a person is being truthful or deceptive. They 
make quick and efficient size-ups in the first few seconds of any interaction. This is a 
basic survival skill that like situational awareness is honed over the course of time and 
continues to improve and evolve. 
Detention and Arrest Authority: Most nonlaw enforcement participants in 
the GNDA do not possess the statutory authority to stop, question, detain, and arrest 
individuals. This is a critical component when considering that the primary goal is not 
merely to find radioactive and nuclear material but to also stop individuals from using 
such product as a weapon. Any person can be trained to use instruments to locate these 
substances but having the legal ability to engage perpetrators without hesitation is 
fundamental.  
Use of Force: It cannot be stated strongly enough that the goal of 
preventing radiological and nuclear terrorism is to identify and locate the persons 
responsible and recover all illicit materials being used. In the simplest terms, this means 
that is reasonable to assume that there will be persons present with the materials that will 





actually stop the incident from occurring is the focus. This means being able to properly 
and effectively utilize physical force, including lethal force, a critical dimension that 
resides in the expertise of law enforcement. 
This blending of acquired awareness, deception detection, conversation 
skills, arrest and detention powers, and lethal force capability is critical in the mission 
and function of PRND. 
Some may argue that this is a national security issue requiring the sole 
attention of federal resources and that local agencies do not have the functionality, the 
budget, personnel, or other resources suited for these types of prevention activities.32 An 
effective counter argument is presented, and the following section reviews the existing 
body of literature on threat existence and viability, the GNDA, and the expanded post-
9/11 role of law enforcement to further sharpen this examination and strengthen support 
for expansion of current law enforcement efforts. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Introduction  
This literature review establishes that the nuclear terrorism threat, albeit remote, 
does merit attention. It will also confirm that the GNDA was created to serve as a 
prevention system that encompasses a vast range of participation from the international to 
the domestic stages. This examination bolsters the proposal that the participation of local 
law enforcement as a function of the GNDA greatly relates to the greater homeland 
security enterprise and it worthy of study.  
There are three parts to this review. Part One addressed the general threat of 
nuclear and radiological terrorism. Part Two discussed the GNDA and the lack of study 
concerning the GNDA's utilization of human capital (namely law enforcement) in the 
prevention of terrorism. Finally, Part Three explores the role of law enforcement in 
                                                 




homeland security, including the evolution of policing that encompasses a 
counterterrorism effort that is embedded in traditional crime prevention. 
2. Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism 
There is a wide and well-established body of knowledge in the area of CBRNE 
(Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives) Terrorism, including 
many sources citing the specific threat of the terrorist's use of radiological and nuclear 
weapons.  
There are three primary arguments posed in the literature concerning Nuclear and 
Radiological Terrorism: 
(1) Exaggeration: The threat of a terrorist's use of a nuclear or radiological 
weapon is overstated and that employing this type of weapon is beyond the 
capabilities of our adversary. 
 
(2) Concerns with Security of Threat Sensitive Material:  There are many 
sources for nuclear and radiological material that could be used for 
weapons throughout the world and security of such materials is a concern. 
This also includes the belief that as the number of nations that possess 
nuclear weapons increases, the possibility of diversion to a terrorist group 
also increases. 
 
(3) A Balanced or “Just in Case” Approach: The risk of an attack using 
these types of weapons, although considered remote, would yield 
consequences so great that all efforts to mitigate their use are a worthwhile 
investment. 
a. Exaggerated Threat 
The reality of a successful nuclear or radiological attack on the United 
States undoubtedly will produce widespread ramifications, vast effects to include not 
only mass casualties, but a tremendous psychological impact on the entire population. To 
illustrate further, the previously discussed Los Angeles “Dirty Bomb” study looked at 
such effects to also include a $16 billion expense incurred by such an attack. There has 
been much public discussion and debate on the possibility of our most notable adversary, 




Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?, RAND's Brian Jenkins extensively analyzes this topic and 
refutes this possibility. In his July 2012 testimony before Congress, he made this salient 
point: 
Al Qaeda’s central leadership clearly had nuclear ambitions and made an 
effort to acquire fissle material and technical expertise. However, there is 
no evidence that they acquired or even came close to acquiring nuclear 
weapons, and at some point in the last decade, the organization’s nuclear 
weapons project turned from an acquisition effort to a propaganda 
program calculated to excite its followers and frighten its foes. 33  
This clearly shows that although there may be ambition, actual 
implementation is a much more complicated process. It is in Al Qaeda’s interest for the 
world to believe they have access to these weapons but reality does not support that 
claim.  
John Parachini also argues that there is little in the historical record in 
terms of successful attacks using CBRN weapons and that the terrorist’s true interest may 
be exaggerated causing government resources to be misused to counter the perceived 
threat. His article, although making a good point for the need to balance efforts against 
the full spectrum of possibilities, does not specifically address the nuclear/radiological 
threat. It does, however, focus on the need for the United States to “strike a balance 
between preparing to address attacks with unconventional or CBRN weapons materials 
and conventional attacks.”34 This article supports the exaggeration position in that he 
suggests that the government has inflated the perception causing an imbalance in 
preventive measures that could be focused on more likely scenarios.  
Many other sources contend that conventional explosives have been, and 
will continue to be, the terrorist’s weapon of choice due to their availability and ease of 
use.35 This argument was advanced at the July 2012 Senate Hearings on terrorism trends 
and tactics as cited by Brian Jenkins:  
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Bombings have remained the most common mode of attack for all terrorist 
groups since the emergence of contemporary terrorism in the 
late1960’s…the vehicle-borne devices have been seen mostly in foiled 
plots and FBI stings. 36 
A counterpoint to Parachini’s article is the Harvard University Belfer 
Center report published in 2010 on Al Qaeda’s attempts to acquire weapons of mass 
destruction. 37 The report chronicles AQ’s efforts to obtain WMD materials needed to 
carry out such an attack. The report states that the group's “top priority has been to 
acquire nuclear and strategic biological weapons.”38 The author, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, 
attributes their lack of success to “…a sustained and ferocious counterterrorist response 
to 9/11 that largely destroyed al Qaeda as the organization that existed before...”39 His 
point being that Al Qaeda may still have the desire to acquire these weapons but lacks the 
means, adding support to Jenkins’ position. Therefore, this body of literature holds that 
while the means to facilitate a nuclear or radiological attack are exaggerated, such an 
exaggeration results in misplaced or excessive preventive measures.  
b. Security Concerns 
The second primary argument in the literature is one that espouses that 
nuclear and radiological materials are present throughout the world and may be acquired 
in a variety of ways. These range from the theft of materials and construction of a device 
to the purchase of a completed weapon from a rogue nation. Numerous works supporting 
both pathways40 were examined and the body of knowledge in this area is quite extensive 
supporting the premise of terrorist groups acquiring this type of weapon. An example 
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found included testimony of Matthew Bunn before the United States Senate41 and his 
Harvard University published report “Securing the Bomb.”42 In both publications, he 
provides historical examples of attempts to acquire weapons and weapons grade 
materials,43 as well as discussing strategies to prevent these occurrences.44 Concerns over 
radiological and nuclear material security support the concept that programs such as law 
enforcement involvement in the GNDA as part of its overall objective of preventing a 
terrorist organization from acquiring nuclear and radiological materials. 
c. Prevention Efforts—Balanced Approach 
The third argument describes the terrorist's use of a nuclear or radioactive 
weapon as a remote possibility but contains elements that efforts on prevention are 
worthy of our investment. Several examples were reviewed, while two underscored that 
the threat is real and the nation’s enemies are interested in acquiring and using them. The 
first example is a joint United States and Russia threat assessment, which concludes:  
Nuclear terrorism is a real and urgent threat. Given the potentially 
catastrophic consequences, even a small probability of terrorists getting 
and detonating a nuclear bomb is enough to justify urgent action to reduce 
the risk. This study makes the case that it is plausible that a technically 
sophisticated group could make, deliver, and detonate a crude nuclear 
bomb if it could obtain sufficient fissile material.45   
The report describes several scenarios that appear plausible but require a 
substantial effort resulting in a low, but not zero, probability of success. It does this by 
walking through a representative plot, the vulnerability analysis of security efforts, and 
device construction challenges.46 
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The report’s conclusion, after observing the issues above, gives the 
following argument for the need to remove barriers to increased prevention and 
nonproliferation efforts:  
Although the international community has recognized the dangers of 
nuclear terrorism, it has yet to develop a comprehensive strategy to lower 
the risks of nuclear terrorism. Major barriers include complacency about 
the threat and the adequacy of existing nuclear security measures; secrecy 
that makes it difficult for states to share information and to cooperate; 
political disputes; competing priorities; lack of funds and technical 
expertise in some countries; bureaucratic obstacles; and the sheer difficulty 
of preventing a potentially small, hard-to-detect team of terrorists from 
acquiring a small, hard-to-detect chunk of nuclear material with which to 
manufacture a crude bomb.47 
Documents, such as the Joint Assessment from the Belfer Center, support 
the protection of fissile material and subsequently reducing its illegal transfer and 
movement. These objectives are shown in the GNDA, and one could surmise that 
preventive costs spent in this endeavor are far less than the billions or trillions lost in an 
actual event. 
The second example is the June 2011 National Strategy for 
Counterterrorism, which states, “The danger of nuclear terrorism is the greatest threat to 
global security.” 48 This White House-produced document provides no justification for 
their claim and reads more as general counterterrorism rhetoric than as giving clear 
evidence to support its propositions. The alternative is that statements made therein are 
based upon classified intelligence information, which lies beyond the scope of this 
literature review.  
Additional works dealing with the likelihood of an attack are Al Mauroni's 
2012 article on nuclear terrorism published in Homeland Security Affairs and Muller and 
Stewart’s “Terror, Security, and Money (2011).” Both are presented here because they 
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are critical of the belief that nuclear or radiological terrorism is imminent, however, both 
contain elements supporting a cost effective preventive strategy as an option.  
Mauroni begins with a statement similar to others: 
Despite the repeated warnings of a nuclear terrorist incident ‘within the 
next three to five years’ there have been in fact no nuclear incidents. There 
have been no reported ‘loose nukes’. There have been no known attempts 
by a terrorist group to build a nuclear weapon. One of the reasons for this 
current state of affairs is that having the intent to become a nuclear-
weapon-owning state is not the same thing as having the capability to 
build and use nuclear weapons.49  
Mauroni later discusses, and is critical of the ‘Securing the Cities’ 
program, which is discussed later as policy option, and its financial implications, “The 
theory is sound, but also costly, assuming the desire is to maintain this capability 24/7 
throughout the year.” 50 This is similar to findings later in this thesis concerning the 
sustainability of such an effort. Mauroni concurs, “Now there may be a more modest 
effort that could be sustainable.”51 This gives support to findings contained herein that a 
flexible cost series of options is most appropriate and program options can be scalable.  
Mueller and Stewart seek in their work to apply a risk/reward type cost 
analysis to the entire post-9/11 homeland security effort. They argue that large sums of 
money have been expended with very little in tangible results or risk reduction. Their 
conclusion is simply, “Given the quite limited hazard terrorism presents, enhanced 
expenditures designed to lower it have been excessive, sometimes massively so…the cost 
benefit ratio does not compute favorably.”52 
They discuss a “dirty bomb” scenario in the port of Long Beach, 
California and an improvised nuclear device being detonated in New York City and 
present cost estimates of $1 trillion and $5 trillion in effects respectively53 but estimate 
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the chances of success for this type of attack at best one in a million.54 The remote 
possibility of this type of event is acknowledged. However, several cost options in a 
prevention effort, including those that have no additional direct cost to a law enforcement 
agency are recommended here as a worthwhile addition to traditional crime prevention. A 
statistical look at dollars spent and resulting risk reduction is well beyond the capability 
of this thesis, which seeks to support prevention efforts that strive to be reasonable and 
benefit all areas of terrorism prevention. This portion of the literature review has 
demonstrated that there is a threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism, although it will 
continue to be debated how large or imminent it may be.  
The next section will look at the existing information on the Global 
Nuclear Detection Architecture including policy documents and corresponding criticism 
of its underlying technology. 
3. Global Nuclear Detection Architecture  
The next section of this review concerning the Global Nuclear Detection 
Architecture (GDNA) falls into two categories: 
(1) Policy documents that outline the components, goals, objectives and 
implementation of the GNDA. These are mostly documents created by the 
United States Department of Homeland Security’s Domestic Nuclear 
Detection Office (DHS-DNDO), which is charged under Presidential 
Homeland Security Directive 14 with managing the GNDA.  
 
(2) Documents which are critical of the utility, progress, and outcomes of the 
GNDA to date. This includes several documents that point to projects in 
which millions of dollars where expended with little or no results. These 
failed efforts lie mostly in the United States Government’s development of 
new sensor and detection technology.  
 
                                                 




a. GNDA Foundation Documents 
The first group described above relates to the creation and implementation 
of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture including the DHS-DNDO 2010 Strategy 
Publication and the original Homeland Security Presidential Directive 14 from April 
2005. Their inclusions demonstrate GNDA objectives and support an assertion that law 
enforcement can add value to the effort. 
In April 2005, the White House released National Security Presidential 
Directive NSPD-43 / Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-14 creating a 
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)55. DNDO is charged with the following: 
(1) To protect against the unauthorized importation, possession, 
storage, transportation, development, or use of a nuclear explosive 
device, fissile material, or radiological material in the United 
States, and to protect against attack using such devices or materials 
against the people, territory, or interests of the United States, it is 
the policy of the United States to:  
(a) Continue to develop, deploy, and enhance national nuclear 
and radiological detection capabilities in an effort to better 
detect, report on, disrupt, and prevent attempts to import, 
possess, store, transport, develop, or use such devices and 
materials;  
(b) Continue to enhance the effective integration of nuclear 
and radiological detection capabilities across Federal, 
State, local, and tribal governments and the private sector 
for a managed, coordinated response; and  
(c) Continue to advance the science of nuclear and 
radiological detection through an aggressive, expedited, 
evolutionary, and transformational program of research 
and development in such detection technologies.56 
Emphasis was added to 1(b) above because it is the focus of this thesis 
concerning the role of law enforcement in the nation's strategy.  
                                                 





The 2010 GNDA Strategic Plan begins with a quote from President 
Barrack Obama delivered in April 2009 in Prague, “We must ensure that terrorists never 
acquire a nuclear weapon. This is the most immediate and extreme threat to global 
security.”57 This statement shows the continued commitment from the Office of the 
President to maintain programs such as the GNDA to form a defense against Nuclear and 
Radiological Terrorism. Again, as was the case with the National Counterterrorism 
Strategy, there were no citations to support the President’s statements. It does, however, 
frame the GNDA discussion as a program that has moved across administrations. 
b. GNDA Criticism 
The second group is a series of articles critical of the technology side of 
the GDNA. They collectively point out failures in the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal 
(ASP) Program. The ASP program is an effort to create new detection technology for use 
at our borders and seaports, which has suffered from budgetary and performance issues. 
A Congressional Research Service (CRS) document reviewed outlined options for 
Congress concerning the program including “further scrutiny of DHS and oversight of 
the testing, certification, and procurement process.”58  
A July 2011, Government Accountability Office (GAO) report was more 
direct in its criticism:  
DNDO's problems developing the ASP and CAARS technologies are 
examples of broader challenges DHS faces in developing and acquiring 
new technologies to meet homeland security needs. Earlier this month, we 
testified that DHS has experienced challenges managing its multibillion-
dollar acquisition efforts, including implementing technologies that did 
not meet intended requirements and were not appropriately tested and 
evaluated, and has not consistently completed analysis of costs and 
benefits before technologies were implemented.59 
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This argument also appears in Mueller and Stewart's work that is critical 
of the fact that the Nation as a whole has done little or no cost-benefit analysis in any 
homeland security program.  
This review uncovered no literature of a professional, academic, or 
governmental nature that examined the human aspect of GNDA implementation or 
operations, including the use of local law enforcement agencies. It is imperative not to 
view technological failure as a rationale to discontinue GNDA operations or as a reason 
to dismiss the potential that law enforcement participation holds in GNDA. While vocal 
criticism of the GNDA exists, it is not a complete condemnation of the GNDA objectives 
in preventing nuclear and radiological terrorism. 
4. Role of Law Enforcement in Homeland Security 
Since September 11, 2001, there has been an evolution in law enforcement. Prior 
to that date, law enforcement was tasked as crime fighters and community problem 
solvers. In the post-9/11 world, all law enforcement agencies have a stake in protecting 
the homeland. Searching for literature in this transition of law enforcement led to several 
works supporting the evolution from crime fighter to terrorism preventer. In what can be 
seen as somewhat of a cliché, “crime prevention is terrorism prevention,”60 lays the 
premise of what has taken place. Many of the same strategies used in countering 
traditional crime can be retooled and expanded for use in countering terrorism.  
A Rutgers University dissertation by Michelle Grillo examined the post-9/11 
transformation in twenty-one police departments nationwide and provided information on 
the new mission, duties, and structural changes that occurred. She notes, “local police 
agencies are now sharing responsibilities in the mission of preventing and detecting 
terrorist activities. The responsibilities to participate in terrorism investigations and 
respond to potential terrorism-related service calls have changed fundamentally the day-
to-day functioning of local police.”61 
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The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) stated in their 2001 
terrorism report:  
No matter how the future unfolds, local law enforcement will be on the 
front lines. In democratic societies, an enormous degree of responsibility 
and authority for public security is historically delegated to the local 
government, particularly to police agencies.62 
This concept was echoed by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) in a 
2005 report on strategies for local law enforcement: 
Law enforcement agencies have historically been charged with preserving 
the safety and security of the public. Regrettably, this mission is no longer 
limited to traditional crime – the prevention and deterrence of another 
terrorist attack on American soil have become a crucial part of this 
mission.63  
Any terrorism event that takes place domestically places law enforcement in the 
leadership role. Washington, DC Metropolitan Police Chief Cathy L. Lanier wrote in 
2005: 
Today’s terrorism is a local crime and with the potential for future attacks 
increasing, it is essential that we engage the more than 800,000 state, local 
and tribal police officers that work in our local communities in strategic 
prevention activities.64  
Her observation focuses law enforcement on becoming a force multiplier, adding 
nearly a million first preventers to this new counterterrorism role. Chief Lanier and other 
experts affirm that local law enforcement has a duty in terrorism prevention and by 
extension that active participation in the GNDA is warranted.  
The author of this thesis has previously written on the role of police in 
radiological material security65 and formally addressed police executives of the IACP. 
Inspector Stuart Cameron, who assisted in thesis, has written on the integration his of 
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department66 in the GNDA as part of the “Securing the Cities” Initiative. However, a 
source search illustrates the full role of law enforcement in the GNDA is unexplored in 
any great depth. There were no sources located that advocated leaving homeland security 
or counterterrorism strictly to federal entities. This should lead a law enforcement agency 
to conclude that homeland security is truly “hometown” security and that all levels of 
government from federal to local play a valuable role in preventing the full spectrum of 
possible terrorism events.  
5. Conclusions and Significance of Research 
The threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism is, in this researcher’s opinion, 
significant; and the potential consequences are great enough to warrant the examination 
of policy options by law enforcement to prevent these types of attacks in a cost effective 
manner. The pursuit of adding to this emerging portion of the homeland security 
enterprise body of knowledge is challenging but worthwhile.  
The next section outlines a methodology that explores these policy options for law 
enforcement prevention programs supporting the GNDA. 
D. DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY OF POLICY OPTIONS ANALYSIS FOR 
LAW ENFORCEMENT PRND PROGRAMS 
1. The Path Forward 
The previous sections have shown that nuclear and radiological terrorism is an 
international concern that requires a coordinated prevention effort as was implemented 
with the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. It is argued that law enforcement brings 
value to the mission through enhancing its traditional crime prevention role and innate 
skill set to meet the need of increasing the domestic layer of the GNDA. By increasing 
the number of law enforcement agencies that participate in Preventive Radiological / 
Nuclear Detection programs, the domestic layer becomes more comprehensive and 
ensures that a true defense in depth model is achieved. 
                                                 




The next step is to examine the several possible paths for a law enforcement 
agency initiating a PRND program. This thesis author has been professionally involved 
with the PRND mission since 2005 and has participated in extensive DHS-DNDO 
programs concerning the domestic implementation of the GNDA. He has served as 
program manager for his employer, the Philadelphia Police Department, for their PRND 
efforts and works on a daily basis with other PRND program managers from across the 
country of every size and type. This research has examined several dozen PRND 
programs currently fielded domestically and identified four broad categories. These four 
categories will form the four policy option models presented in this thesis. Each of the 
four models uses an actual PRND program as a case study to further illustrate its 
comparative strengths and weaknesses. This analysis applies both quantitative and 
qualitative metrics to each of the four policy option models. The next section outlines 
these four program options. 
2. Four Policy Option Models for Consideration 
a. Sole Federal Responsibility 
This represents no action on part of nonfederal law enforcement agencies. 
An agency, after reviewing the threat information, decides not to create a PRND 
program, due to actual or perceived barriers such as funding. Their conclusion is that the 
GNDA effort is not in the purview of local law enforcement and remains within the 
sphere of United States Government (USG) agencies in the national security arena. 
b. Single Law Enforcement Agency Program 
This is a program that includes only the originating law enforcement 
agency. This is the first step in a progressive program that begins with training and 





c. Multi-Agency Law Enforcement Program 
This involves the originating agency and surrounding law enforcement 
entities working in a cooperative program to provide wider prevention coverage. An 
example would be multiple police departments working together in an Urban Area 
Security Initiative (UASI) region.  
d. Multi-Discipline/Multi-Agency PRND Program 
This requires a number of agencies from several geographic jurisdictions 
and from one or more additional public safety agencies such as Fire, EMS, Public Health, 
as well as State and Private Sector Radiological Professionals. This program option 
combines the inherent strengths of law enforcement in counterterrorism programs with 
the technical expertise and response capabilities of other first responders. 
3. PRND Policy Option Analysis Through Existing Examination of 
Represented Case Studies 
a. Case Study Selection Process 
Four existing Preventive / Nuclear Detection (PRND) programs will be 
examined67 as case studies in this policy options analysis.  
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Visible Intermodal 
Prevention and Response (VIPR) Teams will be used as an example of the “no action of 
part of nonfederal law enforcement.” This assumes that a jurisdiction has examined the 
radiological / nuclear threat and determined that its prevention is a responsibility of 
federal agencies. The TSA VIPR program exemplifies a federal PRND operation 
concentrated on surface transportation that blends intelligence-driven, steady state, and 
special event coverage.68  
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For the single agency example, the Los Angeles County Sheriff 
Department’s PRND program will be used. This is a robust, county-level, steady-state 
program in one of the nation's largest metropolitan areas that incorporates a strong 
maritime presence in the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, California.  
The Philadelphia Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) Law Enforcement 
PRND program will serve as the example for Multiple Agency/Jurisdiction—Single 
Discipline option. It includes a major city department, a number of smaller suburban 
departments, and a major university police force.   
The New York City centered program known as “Securing the Cities,” 
which comprises three states and over 200 agencies under the coordination of thirteen 
principal partners, will serve as the last model presented—Multiple 
Agency/Discipline/State option. Here, law enforcement at the city, county, and state level 
from New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut work with fire service, health department, 
and radiation safety professionals to form the largest single PRND program in the nation.  
b. Cost Analysis 
For each policy option presented, there will be a cost estimate for 
initiation and sustainment. There is a cost figure attached to each piece of equipment and 
its related maintenance; as well as personnel costs for training and exercises.  
c. Comparison to National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
Resource Typing Criteria for Preventive Radiological / Nuclear 
Detection (PRND) 
Fully contained in Appendix C of this document is the June 2011 final 
version of the Typed Resource Definitions for Preventive Radiological / Nuclear 
Detection Resources. It covers typing of both a PRND team (several models) and 




The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office of the Department of Homeland 
Security describes the purpose of the document as follows:69 
Purpose: 
PRND NIMS Resource Typing categorizes the PRND teams, equipment, and 
personnel employed by federal, state, local, and tribal entities to conduct the PRND mission 
and enhance the sharing and integration of these PRND resources across jurisdictions.  
Benefits: 
By providing a common categorization of PRND resources, the PRND NIMS 
Resource Type Definitions directly support state, local, and tribal jurisdictions’ PRND 
planning and operations.  
- Facilitates the creation state, local, and tribal PRND programs  
- Assists jurisdictions to categorize current and future PRND resources  
- Provides common building blocks for state, local, and tribal jurisdictions 
when estimating capability needs while using the PRND Capability Development Framework  
- Increases the speed and effectiveness of interstate mutual aid requests 
through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) and other resource 
management mechanisms  
The Domestic Nuclear Detection (DNDO) coordinated the PRND NIMS 
Resource Type Definitions development, in partnership with federal, state, and local subject 
matter experts. 
Agencies should strongly consider using the equipment and team 
descriptions contained in the PRND NIMS document as future homeland security grant 
funding will likely be tied to compliance of this standard. 
d. Qualitative Factors 
(1) Political Acceptance. Each of the four program options is 
examined respective of political acceptance. One consideration being—have they been 
                                                 




viewed in a positive manner and recognized as being an appropriate homeland security 
counter measure in their respective areas? In the case of the NYC region “Securing the 
Cities” program, it has been saved from funding elimination based largely on its political 
acceptance.  
(2) Program Flexibility / Sustainability. Finally, each program 
is examined to predict if its size and structure based on NIMS typing and Capability 
Framework Development levels can be funded in the current environment of reduced 
homeland security grant funding. The test of these programs is if they will survive if the 
outside funding is removed or would they have to be scaled back or eliminated. 
e. Conclusion 
As stated earlier, existing PRND programs are used in the next section as 
case studies for each option to further demonstrate the features. Each program will be 







6. Operations Support 
Chapter IV has a matrix depicting the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
each option. Assessment criteria include NIMS typing, training costs, equipment and 
sustainment costs, and an overall program ranking. The final program scoring is scaled in 
the form of Limited, Good, Better, Best formatting and includes text descriptions to 
support the ranking assigned.  
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III. PREVENTIVE RADIOLOGICAL/NUCLEAR DETECTION 
POLICY OPTION MODELS PRESENTED WITH SUPPORTING 
CASE STUDIES 
A. MODEL DESCRIPTION INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter proposed a role for law enforcement as part of the Global 
Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) and how law enforcement's unique blend of 
traditional crime prevention adds value domestically to an international preventive 
strategy.  
This chapter will present four policy option models and outline six program 
aspects that will be used later for analysis.  
Each PRND policy model presented here will begin with an overview and then 
proceed through six POETE/Ops factors taken from the DHS-DNDO Program 
Management Handbook: 
1. Planning- Develop a program strategy, begin and manage a PRND 
Program.71   
 
2. Organization- Organizational Design, Stakeholder Engagement, and 
Staffing a PRND Program.72 
 
3. Equipment- Selection, Acquisition, and Maintenance.73 
 
4. Training- Develop, Establish, and Manage program Training. 74 
 
5. Exercises- Develop, Establish, and Manage program Exercises.75 
 
6. Operations Support- Technical Reachback and Information Sharing 
Support including from federal assets.76 
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B. PRND POLICY OPTION MODELS 
1. Option A: PRND is a Federal Law Enforcement Responsibility 
a. No Local Action 
A law enforcement agency may take the position that the prevention of 
radiological and nuclear terrorism is well outside their area of responsibility. This is the 
general default position of the vast majority of agencies in the nation.77 It may be an issue 
of not being aware that such a threat exists, a lack of exposure to GNDA and its 
components, or simply a budgetary or personnel restraint. Agencies may view this type of 
homeland security mission residing more in the realm of national security and squarely 
the purview of federal law enforcements or even the military. Another perspective may 
be that radiation and radiological / nuclear materials are hazardous materials, not law 
enforcement’s responsibility but that of the Fire Service or established State Radiation 
Safety agencies. 
There are a number of federal agencies that are active in the prevention of 
this type of terrorism and deploy personnel and equipment as part of the federal domestic 
component of the GNDA. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Customs and Border 
Patrol, Coast Guard, National Guard Civil Support Teams, and the Departments of 
Energy and Homeland Security have active PRND programs that provide limited 
coverage of our ports, borders, airports, and “as warranted” coverage in some 
metropolitan areas.78 The analysis of this model in Chapter IV will focus on the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Visible Intermodal Prevention and 
Response (VIPR) program as it is structured in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Field 
Office for demonstration purposes.79  
The model attributes below are viewed from an outside law enforcement 
agency without its own PRND program interacting with this federally based program. 
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Due to the fact that this option model is external to a law enforcement agency considering 
a program, this unique reverse view approach is needed for this option’s analysis alone. 
The TSA program, along with other federal programs, has agency specific operations that 
lie outside the scope of this thesis. 
b. Model Attributes 
(1) Planning. A local law enforcement agency without its own PRND 
program would ideally plan on how to integrate federal assets, such as TSA's VIPR, into 
its existing operations in this model. A formal plan may exist in this model for federal 
assets to conduct the PRND mission although it is unlikely since the agency may not be 
aware of the PRND mission, equipment, or capabilities associated with radiological / 
nuclear terrorism prevention. Law enforcement, without their own dedicated PRND 
program, should plan for the involvement of federal assets under this model. 
 (2) Organization. The federal PRND model will be a small team 
framework and will require logistical assistance from local law enforcement agencies to 
carry out most missions beyond preventive patrol. Law enforcement, without their own 
dedicated PRND program, should prepare for joint deployment of personnel with federal 
assets under this model. 
 (3) Equipment. Equipment in the federal model will run from basic 
detection gear through advanced isotope identification capabilities. Using the NIMS 
typing contained in Appendix C of this document; the TSA VIPR team meets the 
capability of a Type 3 NIMS PRND Team while specialized teams from the Department 
of Energy would exceed the Type 1 classification.80 Law enforcement, without their own 
dedicated PRND program, should understand the equipment capabilities of the nearest 
federal assets under this model. 
 
 (4) Training. Training under this model will usually take place at the 
national level without participation of the non-PRND law enforcement agencies in the 
                                                 





area of the federal team. The training is likely to occur at centralized locations and not in 
the federal teams geographic area of assignment. However, if local agencies are invited to 
participate, they would be well served to do so.  
 (5) Exercises. Exercises conducted under this model will usually take 
place at the national level without participation of the non-PRND law enforcement 
agencies in the area of the federal team. However, if local agencies are invited to 
participate, they would be well served to do so.  
 (6) Operations Support. Federal PRND assets will always use federal 
technical reach-back and alarm adjudication through one of the National Laboratories. 
This is not the case in all of the succeeding models. Law enforcement agencies should 
also understand that if they call upon federal PRND assets, the local FBI field office and 
DHS will be notified of their operations.  
This concludes the PRND option model where the local law enforcement 
agency is a nonparticipant and likely is the client of the federal team deployed. This “no 
local action” model was cumbersome to adapt to the POETE/Ops framework but the 
remaining three models, where local participation exists, more suitably fit this 
framework. 
The next policy option model is a law enforcement agency adopting a 
single agency approach to the POETE/Ops framework. 
2. Single Agency Law Enforcement PRND Program Option 
a. Embarking Alone 
A law enforcement agency may determine that it is in their best interest to 
begin a locally-based PRND Program. Often, this may be a first step in a program’s 
progression. Examples will be presented in subsequent sections of this thesis in cases of 
Philadelphia and New York. The agency trains and purchases detection equipment and 
chooses to implement one or more of the PRND mission areas covered earlier—Steady 
State, Enhanced Steady State/Special, and/or Intelligence/Threat driven search 




of urban and suburban subdivisions is used as the model case study to analyze this policy 
option.  
b. Model Attributes 
 (1) Planning. A local law enforcement agency with its own PRND 
program initially plans how to equip, train, and provide exercises to its own members in 
one or more of the relevant missions: Material Protection and Response, Steady State, 
Intelligence Driven, and/or Enhanced Steady State/Special Event coverage. Standard 
operating procedures are developed to guide the department's personnel in each of the 
mission areas that apply. If local PRND capabilities are limited, the jurisdiction’s 
planning should include partnering with federal programs or other applicable responding 
agencies as needed to close the gaps. 
 (2) Organization. A single agency PRND program is organized along 
departmental lines like any other unit or program in the respective agency. A clear chain 
of command will dictate how radiological and nuclear incidents are handled and when 
responsibility is transferred to another entity, such as the FBI.  
 (3) Equipment. Single agency PRND programs seek equipment 
relative to the missions it intends on conducting. If choosing to conduct the full spectrum 
of PRND activities it will need to have organic, or in-house, equipment to provide these 
capabilities. This extends to aviation and marine detection equipment if appropriate to the 
jurisdiction.  
 (4) Training. Training under this model typically uses federally 
sponsored PRND courses taught through a jurisdiction's request to DHS. Many programs 
also us “train-the-trainer” opportunities which allow for their agency to conduct the same 
courses “in-house” leading to savings in areas such as personnel costs. 
 (5) Exercises. Exercises conducted under this model normally begin 
internally to ensure that departmental policies are being followed. As experience 





 (6) Operations Support. There are only two options for operations 
support for nonfederal PRND programs of all types. The most common is the use of 
federal assets such as DNDO's Joint Analysis Center (JAC) in Washington, DC or one of 
the National Laboratories directly. The second option is using the respective State 
Radiological Agency for technical reach back and alarm adjudication. All programs 
shown herein as case studies use the JAC. The State of Illinois PRND program81 is an 
example of a state-based operations support mechanism that does not use the JAC.  
This concludes the PRND option model for a single law 
enforcement agency to use as its own organic PRND program. The next policy option 
model is for a law enforcement agency choosing a collaborative, regional approach with 
several other law enforcement agencies applying the POETE/Ops framework. 
3. Multi Agency Law Enforcement PRND Program Option 
a. Working with Law Enforcement Peers 
Another option for law enforcement agencies is to engage partners in 
order to pool resources, such as equipment and training, or to collaborate with other 
response organizations, such as Fire Departments or traditional radiation safety 
professionals in the public or private sector. This option can also be viewed as the next 
step in a progression to the final option presented in the next section. A multi-
jurisdiction/agency approach can provide a means to provide some PRND capability over 
a wider area and allow for joint operations to increase capabilities not possessed by each 
individual agency leading to a cost savings on training, equipment and related activities.  
b. Model Attributes 
 (1) Planning. In the multi-agency program, all planning activities are 
conducted jointly with the other members. If there is one dominant agency, the others 
may choose to follow that department's existing program and make needed changes 
caused by expansion of the program. For example, the Philadelphia Police Department's 
                                                 





PRND program became the UASI PRND program through an expansion process in the 
region. Planning efforts began in the City and were enhanced as new members entered 
the program. 
 (2) Organization. As with planning, organization in the multi-agency 
model will be collaborative in nature with standing policies and procedures for joint 
operations among the partner member agencies. The limiting factor is that it still is a 
model composed of primarily law enforcement and is not multi-discipline as shown in the 
final option.  
 (3) Equipment. Multi-agency PRND programs seek equipment 
relative to the missions it intends to conduct. If choosing to conduct the full spectrum of 
PRND activities, it needs to have organic, or in-house, equipment to provide these 
capabilities. This extends to aviation and marine detection equipment if appropriate to the 
jurisdiction. The advantage to multi-agency programs is that equipment can be spread 
across the various partners and used by all on an “as needed” basis. This allows for 
avoiding equipment duplication by all member agencies resulting in a cost savings.  
 (4) Training. Training under this model usually take uses federally 
sponsored PRND courses taught at a jurisdiction's request to DHS. Many programs 
employ “train-the-trainer” opportunities which then allows their agency to conduct the 
same courses “in-house” leading to savings in areas such as personnel costs. Due to the 
multi-agency aspect of this model, officers from each department are trained together to 
further instill the joint operations stressed in its design. 
 (5) Exercises. Exercises conducted under this model are multi-agency 
in scope in order to stress the partnering aspect of the model. The limiting factor is that 
they include only the partner agencies and would benefit from the participation of other 
disciplines.  
 (6) Operations Support. There are only two options for operations 
support for nonfederal PRND programs of all types. The most likely is the use of federal 
assets such as the JAC in Washington, DC or one of the National Laboratories directly. 
The second option allows for the use of a State Radiological Agency for operations 




This concludes the multi-agency law enforcement PRND program model. 
Next is the final policy option model, a multi-agency and multi-discipline program that 
covers multiple states. 
4. Multi-Discipline/Multi-Agency PRND Program 
a. Working with all Response Partners 
In this option, a large geographic area encompassing several states and 
political subdivisions of every size and type work across disciplinary lines to achieve a 
true defense in depth approach to PRND. The challenges here involve the need for a large 
source of continued funding as well as a standing organization to manage the program 
ensuring unity of effort and consistency for training and equipment as well as a common 
set of operating procedures. Although this type of effort may be daunting to attempt, the 
benefits of this type of program include the ability to provide cost effective coverage 
across a region. In the later example, the greater New York City area is shown, an 
obvious potential terrorism target, and Suffolk County, New York is shown as a 
representative principle partner.   
b. Model Attributes 
 (1) Planning. In the multi-discipline/multi-agency program model, all 
planning is done through formal committees with representation by all principal partners. 
This ensures the most thorough level of planning respective of each partner's unique skill 
set and needs relative to the Preventive Radiological / Nuclear Detection effort. It is the 
most comprehensive planning model of all the options presented.  
 (2) Organization. This model utilizes a formal committee 
organization with an executive board and subordinate groups focusing on all aspects of 
program management and delivery with input from all partner agencies. Due to its multi-
discipline design, this is the most comprehensive organizational model presented.  
 (3) Equipment. Multi-discipline PRND programs seek equipment 
relative to the missions it intends to conduct. If choosing to perform the full spectrum of 




capabilities. This extends to aviation and marine detection equipment if appropriate to the 
jurisdiction. The advantage to multi-discipline programs, as was seen with the multi-
agency program previously, is that equipment can be spread across the various partners 
and used by all on an “as needed” basis. This allows for avoiding equipment duplication 
by all member disciplines resulting in a cost savings.  
 (4) Training. Training under this model often uses federally 
sponsored PRND courses taught at a lead jurisdiction's request to DHS. Many programs 
employ “train-the-trainer” opportunities which allows for their multi-disciplinary 
program to conduct the same courses “in-house” leading to savings in areas such as 
personnel costs. Due to the inter-disciplinary nature of this model, responders are trained 
together to further instill the joint operations stressed in its design and foster an 
appreciation for the skills each discipline contributes to the program.  
 (5) Exercises. Exercises conducted under this model will be multi-
disciplinary in scope in order to stress the partnering aspect of the model of responders 
from police, fire, public health, and traditional radiological professionals. This overcomes 
the limiting factor is seen in the previous multi-agency law enforcement-centric program 
model.  
 (6) Operations Support. There are only two options for operations 
support for nonfederal PRND programs of all types. The most common is the use of 
federal assets, such as the JAC in Washington, DC, or one of the National Laboratories. 
The second option is to use the respective State Radiological Agency for technical reach 
back and alarm adjudication. In the multi-discipline model, the State Radiological 
Agency may itself be a principle partner making this an beneficial option.  
This concludes the program model descriptions that will be used in 
Chapter IV for analysis using case study examples. The following section discusses 
organizations that all law enforcement based programs should interact with on an “as 




C. COLLABORATION OPTIONS BEYOND LAW ENFORCEMENT 
1. Traditional Federal/State/Local Radiological Safety Agency 
Professionals 
Law enforcement agencies beginning a PRND program can benefit by interacting 
with the more traditional radiological safety professionals at every level of government. 
These include the Department of Energy at the federal level, the state office of radiation 
protection and safety, and perhaps the local health department, which may have some 
responsibilities in this area. An agency may choose to partner with these agencies as a 
formal component. The NIMS Typing document in Appendix C includes multi-
disciplinary PRND teams. The major shortcoming to nonlaw enforcement participants is 
they tend to lack the skill set discussed in the earlier section outlining the efficacy of law 
enforcement, e.g., arrest, detention, use of force and investigative competencies. All 
PRND programs benefit from positive interaction with this community in the form of 
secondary screening and technical reach-back. 
2. Fire Service / HAZMAT 
Similar to traditional radiation safety professionals, the Fire Service provides a 
wealth of assistance handling radiological and nuclear events through its traditional 
hazardous materials capabilities. These will be critical in the post-detection phase or 
during the aftermath of an attack. The Fire Service lacks arrest, detention, use of force 
authority and can be employed best in joint teams staffed with law enforcement officers. 
Fire Service professionals can also be of assistance in secondary screening and technical 
reach-back operations. 
3. Military 
Law enforcement-based PRND programs also partner with military assets at some 
special event and/or intelligence driven search operations. These will likely be Civil 
Support Teams (CST) from the state National Guard Bureau. CSTs are typically 20–25 
National Guard personnel that are equipped with Personal Radiation Detectors (PRDs), 




Backpacks.82 They can serve as force multipliers to handle large venues such as sports 
stadiums, or outdoor events such as parades. As seen in previous groups, they lack the 
arrest, detention, use of force, authority of law enforcement and are best deployed in joint 
teams as described in Appendix C, NIMS Typing. 
4. Private Sector Radiological Professionals 
An often-overlooked group is the private sector, which includes the radiation 
safety officers from hospitals, universities, and industries that use radiological materials 
in their daily course of business. Programs such as the Global Threat Reduction Initiative 
(GTRI), which seeks to voluntarily increase radioactive material security at civilian sites, 
such as hospitals and universities, provide a pathway to establishing a relationship with 
these stakeholders. A law enforcement agency would be greatly served by having an 
existing relationship with its radioactive materials license holders before a theft or other 
incident occurs at their site. Random visits by patrol personnel to these sites are another 
layer in the “defense in depth” strategy of the GNDA. These organizations can also be of 
great service in terms of training, and support in the form of instrument calibration and 
maintenance. Their experience with these types of instruments and their expertise cannot 
be overstated. The Philadelphia Police Department's PRND program, described later, has 
benefited immensely from partnering with the Environmental and Radiation Health 
professionals at the University of Pennsylvania. They have assisted as training 
instructors, participated in numerous drills and exercises, and provided their radioactive 
sources as aids to enhance the overall effectiveness of Philadelphia's program.  
D. CONCLUSION 
In this section, four policy model options have been presented as frameworks for 
law enforcement PRND programs. The models were shown to highlight the similarities 
and differences regarding POETE-Ops structure. By defining each model in this way, it 
assists policy makers in choosing the program type that meets their jurisdictional needs 
                                                 





and financial constraints. The next chapter analyzes each of the four program models 
using an existing law enforcement PRND program case study with regards to: 
 
 1. Cost Analysis: including training, equipment, and sustainment costs 
 2. NIMS Typing Analysis, by type definition 
 3. Program Evaluation including POETE-Ops (Limited, Good, Better, Best) 













IV. POLICY OPTION ANALYSIS 
The previous chapters have introduced the background and justification for law 
enforcement’s entry into the GNDA’s domestic layer, as well as outlining four decision 
options concerning implementing Preventive Radiological Nuclear Detection efforts. 
This chapter will expand upon those options and compare the criteria introduced in the 
methodology section to allow agency managers to choose a program that meets their 
needs and budgetary restrictions.  
A. NO LOCAL ACTION—FEDERAL PRND PROGRAM EXAMPLE  
1. Program Overview—TSA Visible Intermodal Prevention and 
Response 
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) was created to increase aviation security for commercial passenger 
air travel. The most visible portion of TSA are the screening operations conducted by 
uniformed employees at every airport in the nation. Another aspect of a TSA layered 
security program is the Federal Air Marshall (FAM) deployment of plainclothes officers 
on random flights to act as a deterrent to highjacking and other terrorism related events 
onboard some domestic and international flights. The Visible Intermodal Prevention and 
Response (VIPR) program is the deployment of FAMs to surface transportation venues 
such as passenger rail, mass transit, and commercial vehicle enforcement. These are 
federal law enforcement officers that act in uniform, as opposed to the traditional 
undercover role of FAMs, and can be deployed in response to an increased threat or in a 
general deterrent posture in AMTRAK facilities, bus depots and other mass transit 
stations. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) has provided training and 
PRND equipment to  VIPR to “provide a greater federal detection capability and add an 
additional layer of RN detector-equipped law enforcement personnel in support of the 
GNDA.”83 
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The Philadelphia TSA Field Office currently deploys a VIPR team of 
approximately ten federal Air Marshalls that are rotated from their flying duties to 
surface transportation for a fixed period of time (less than one year). They are trained and 
equipped with PRDs, RIIDs, and Radiation Detection Backpacks to conduct these 
activities. They interact routinely with the Philadelphia UASI PRND program detailed 
later in this document. 
The succeeding sections will evaluate the model’s costs, its respective designation 
under the PRND NIMS Typing,84 qualitative factors, POETE-Ops program evaluation, 
and a respective ranking compared to the other three program models presented. 
2. Cost Analysis 
The below cost analysis, using the normalized figures presented on Appendix B 
of this document are an approximation for the PRND capability of the Philadelphia Field 
Office for ten members of the VIPR. Actual costs may vary from region to region and 
this is best used as a planning factor for agencies considering starting a PRND program 
of this size and scope. 
 
Ten Person TSA VIPR TEAM: 
 Equipment: 10 PRDs  @  $1,000 each  $10,000 
           2 RIIDs  @ $20,000 each  $40,000 
           2 Backpacks @ $45,000 each  $90,000 
 Training:    10 personnel for 5 days of PRND training $25,000 
($500 per person per day for 5 days) 
       TOTAL $165,000 
 
Equipment sustainment costs are approximately $4,000 per year.85 
                                                 
84 Appendix C contains information on how to obtain the PRND NIMS Typing Document in its 
entirety. 





3. NIMS Typing Analysis 
Referring to Appendix C of this document, TSA VIPR Philadelphia represents a 
NIMS Type III Law Enforcement PRND Team. The definition of Type III is that of 
“Human Portable wide area detection and isotope identification.” The primary separation 
point from Type IV to Type III is the use of Radiation Detection Backpacks for wide area 
searches. The cost analysis of $165,000 would represent any jurisdiction’s baseline to 
establish a Type III team. For a comparison, the deletion of the backpacks would save 
$90,000 and reduce training by one day resulting in a NIMS Type IV LE team.  
4. Analysis of Qualitative Factors 
The political acceptance factor here is twofold. One position may be that there is 
someone performing the PRND mission in the jurisdiction thereby relieving the local law 
enforcement agency of the responsibility. The other may be that the federal officers are 
not part of the community, do not possess situational awareness, and not integrated in an 
overall local homeland security and crime prevention strategy. These factors will need to 
be gauged on a case by case basis by respective jurisdictions. The TSA VIPR teams can 
provide solid coverage, if integrated into special event, or intelligence-based search 
operations by a local jurisdiction. 
The relatively low cost of the program both in terms of start-up and sustainability 
appear favorable for its sustainability in a tightening budgetary environment. The fact 
that it is a Type III team lends favorably to its expandability to Type II, or I if more 
funding becomes available. 
5. Program Evaluation 
a. Planning—Is federal centric and follows a national model. Local 
law enforcement would conform to their policy as opposed to a local protocol. Local 
input to this deployment is minimal leading to a rating of LIMITED. 
b. Organization—As with planning, organization follows a national 
model with minimal room for customization. This again leads to a rating of LIMITED 




c. Equipment—Equipment purchasing for federal PRND programs 
is centralized within the respective agency and may not always fit unique jurisdictional 
challenges. For that reason, a rating of LIMITED is given. The local agency will be 
restricted to the equipment that the respective federal programs deploy in their area. 
d. Training—Training in federal PRND programs is again 
centralized and standard throughout the respective agency and may or may not involve 
local law enforcement agencies. This results in a rating of LIMITED. 
e. Exercises—PRND related exercise program in federal programs 
are again centralized and standard throughout the respective agency and may or may not 
involve local law enforcement agencies. This results in a rating of LIMITED. 
f. Operations Support—Federal PRND programs will always 
utilize operations support from the Joint Analysis Center run by DNDO in Washington, 
DC or directly with one of the National Laboratories. This results in comprehensive 
analysis and earns a rating BEST.  
This program option analysis can serve as a model for a law enforcement agency 
that wishes to create a small, special event or intelligence based search PRND program 
for under $200,000. It represents real capability in the PRND mission space at a 
reasonable cost and can serve as a foundation for a stepped approach to increased 
capability. It shows that a small team, in this case ten operators, can provide substantial 
coverage to enhance special event security and also work with other agencies such as 
with the FBI in a threat-based search scenario. Its major limiting factor is that because it 
consists of only ten operators, long term or wide area operations will be difficult to 
sustain without assistance. 
6. Option Analysis Summary 
Table 3 gives a cost summary and rates the interoperability and expandability of 
the No Local Action program, especially if used as a baseline for creating a similar local 
law enforcement program. The final evaluation rating of LIMITED is based upon this 
program being a federal program that may or may not have a relationship with all local 













Interoperability Expandability Overall 
Program 
Evaluation 
3 $140,000 $25,000 $4,000 YES YES LIMITED
  
The TSA VIPR program’s major disadvantage is that its members are rotated on a 
regular basis and may not achieve the jurisdictional situational awareness mentioned 
earlier as an advantage for law enforcement agencies involvement in the GNDA.  
The next program model analyzed is a single law enforcement agency creating 
their own PRND program.  
B. EMBARKING ALONE—SINGLE AGENCY PRND PROGRAM 
1. Program Overview—Los Angeles County Sheriff’s PRND Program86 
Los Angeles County covers 4,084 square miles and contains 88 incorporated 
cities. The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD) provides contracted law 
enforcement services for 42 cities and all unincorporated areas through twenty-three 
patrol stations. LASD also provides law enforcement services for community colleges, 
county parks, hospitals, all rail and bus operations within the county, as well as jail 
security and court bailiffs. LASD has approximately 10,000 sworn deputies and an 
additional 8,000 support staff making it the largest sheriff’s department in the world. The 
department has an aviation capability with twenty-one helicopters and marine operations 
with eight patrol boats. The department runs the largest jail operation in the free world 
with an average daily inmate population of approximately 20,000. 
In 2004, the department received grant funding to begin a Preventive Radiation / 
Nuclear Detection (PRND) program. The department purchased 455 Personal Radiation 
Detectors (PRDs) for interdiction operations. The department also purchased survey 
meters and two Radiological Isotope Identification Devices (RIIDs) for this mission. In 
                                                 
86 Information provided by Sergeant Michael Kelleher, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department 
PRND Program Manager. Sergeant Kelleher and the author have worked collectively on PRND issues 




2005, 405 radiation pagers were deployed to patrol stations with an additional 50 held for 
surge operations. A policy was crafted for patrol officers to carry out a steady state 24/7 
mission and a HazMat Detail to conduct secondary screenings. 
As funding increased, and in addition to steady state patrol the LASD PRND 
program added additional aviation and marine PRND capabilities, as well as conducted 
operations at special events. Currently, LASD has the capability to field one Type I and 
two Type II Law Enforcement PRND Teams.87  The department can field five Maritime 
Law Enforcement PRND teams and currently has the ability to field three airborne 
mobile systems.  
The succeeding sections will evaluate the model’s costs, its respective designation 
under the PRND NIMS Typing,88 qualitative factors, POETE-Ops program evaluation, 
and a respective ranking compared to the other three program models presented. 
2. Cost Analysis 
The cost analysis below, using the normalized figures presented in Appendix B of 
this document are an approximation for the PRND capability of the Los Angeles County 
Sheriff’s Department's PRND Program. Actual costs may vary from region to region and 
this is best used as a planning factor for agencies considering starting a PRND program 
of this size and scope. 
                                                 






LASD PRND PROGRAM 
 Equipment:  455 PRDs   @  $1,000 each  $455,000 
           12 RIIDs   @ $20,000 each  $240,000 
           1 High Res RIID  @      $100,000 each            $100,000 
           8 Backpacks   @ $45,000 each  $360,000 
           6 Mobile Systems @ $100,000 each $600,000 
 Training:     3,000 for PRD Training (1hour* In Service) $187,500 
          50 for RIID Training (2 days)    $50,000 
          50 for Backpack Training (1 day)   $25,000  
                      25 for Mobile System Training (1 day)   $12,500 
  
       TOTAL $2,030,000 
* LASD uses a one hour course as opposed to an eight hour used by all other case studies 
Equipment sustainment costs are approximately $86,000 per year.89 
3. NIMS Typing Analysis 
The Los Angeles County Sheriff Department’s PRND program easily meets the 
definition of a NIMS Type I Law Enforcement PRND team as outlined in Appendix C of 
this document. They can field a number of additional Type II, III, and IV teams as 
needed, as well as specialized Maritime PRND teams defined in the NIMS document. 
They also possess hundreds of PRDs that are deployed to field patrol units that would be 
considered “individual resources” under the NIMS typing approach. This gives LASD the 
ability to surge detection equipment for steady state, special event, and intelligence 
driven scenarios throughout the Los Angeles area.  
4. Analysis of Qualitative Factors 
Political acceptance of the LASD program is considered high. The department is 
responsible for a large portion of southern California with a dense and diverse population. 
                                                 





The Department engages in a full spectrum of counterterrorism activities, and its PRND 
program compliments its overall strategy. As a major strategic port, its maritime PRND 
capabilities are currently unparalleled in the area.  
A large program, such as LASD, requires steady funding to ensure sustainability. 
This program has some advantages in this area, as it receives Urban Area Security 
Initiative (UASI), Port Security Grants, and was recently invited to apply to become the 
second region in the “Securing the Cities” program (STC), which is shown as the last 
policy option in this analysis. The program can easily expand into “Securing the Cities,” 
if accepted as it has a solid framework on which to build. However, the LASD has 
identified training as a weakness. It only conducted one hour of PRD training for three 
thousand of its personnel and would like to expand the hours of training and number of 
patrol personnel trained. The acquisition of STC status would make that possible. 
5. Program Evaluation 
a. Planning—The LASD program has a robust Con-Ops, concept of 
operations, that steers patrol, aviation, and marine operations including procedures for 
their HazMat detail and special event coverage. They also have procedures for interacting 
with other response organizations as a situation dictates. The program is based upon the 
LASD alone, leading to a rating of GOOD for its planning and related processes.  
b.  Organization—The LASD program is run by its HazMat detail and has a 
clear chain of command for incident management including joint federal operations and 
investigations. Again, the single agency model is rated as GOOD for organizational 
effectiveness. 
c. Equipment—The LASD program has extensive equipment capabilities 
extending to aviation and marine assets built over a period of several years. This 
approach scores as BEST in this analysis.  
d. Training—The LASD PRND program initially provided only in-house 




prepared to conduct the full range of PRND related activities. Currently, the rating of 
GOOD is given.  
e. Exercises—The Los Angeles Sheriff's Department's PRND program 
participates in a number of exercises each year to hone its capabilities. As the program is 
single agency focused,  most exercises are internal in nature leading to a ranking of 
GOOD. In 2010, the department led a large multi-agency drill in conjunction with the 
FBI.  
f.  Operations Support—LASD utilizes the Joint Analysis Center run by 
DNDO in Washington, DC and the National Laboratories leading to a ranking of BEST.  
The LASD Program can serve as a “model program” for a large single agency 
program. It interfaces with other response partners as needed to provide comprehensive 
coverage of the greater Los Angeles metropolitan area. It shows a NIMS Type I 
capability with subordinate Type II, III, IV teams deployed as needed and individual 
resources that can be used as a stepped approach for any law enforcement agency 
pursuing a PRND mission. The program would expand easily in the STC program and its 
maritime efforts are notable in the area of port security. 
6. Option Analysis Summary 
Table 4 gives a cost summary and rates the interoperability and expandability of 
the program, especially if used as a baseline for creating a similar local law enforcement 
program. The final evaluation of GOOD is based upon this program being a large local 
single agency law enforcement program that interacts with other mission partners, such 
as the ports and airport police in their respective areas of responsibility. The program 




























$86,000 YES YES GOOD 
 
C. WORKING WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT PEERS—MULTI-AGENCY 
PRND PROGRAM 
1. Program Overview—Philadelphia Urban Area Security Initiative 
Law Enforcement PRND Program 
The Philadelphia Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) PRND program began in 
2005 with the Philadelphia Police Department, the agency program described in the next 
section, and has steadily expanded as funding became available. The current program has 
four principle partners: 
• Philadelphia Police Department 
• University of Pennsylvania Police Department 
• Bucks County Major Incident Response Team (MIRT) 
• Montgomery County Major Incident Response Team (MIRT) 
The partnership between the University of Pennsylvania and the Philadelphia 
Police Department was critical in the development and continued success of the program. 
Radiation safety professionals from the university actively participate in training and 
manage the radioactive sources employed by the program. The University specifically 
modified its Nuclear Regulatory Commission license to have approval to support the 
PRND Program and training of first responders through the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania. The University of Pennsylvania, its police force, and Philadelphia Police 
Department served as the model site for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) 




The Philadelphia UASI PRND program currently is law enforcement centric but 
actively engages Fire/Hazmat personnel and federal assets, such as the FBI, TSA's VIPR, 
Coast Guard and National Guard Civil Support Team. The program also works closely 
with the Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection and National Nuclear Security 
Administration. 
The program is a regional multi-agency endeavor that uses common equipment, 
training, tactics, techniques, and procedures that ensures consistency across the five 
counties of Southeastern Pennsylvania. The program maintains a relationship with the 
“Securing the Cities” program in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, as well as 
PRND efforts in the National Capitol Region surrounding the District of Columbia.  
The Philadelphia UASI Region was invited in May 2012, as was Los Angeles and 
seven other UASI regions, to apply to become the second “Securing the Cities” program 
area. The Philadelphia and Los Angeles programs are both well positioned in that regard 
and their existing programs would provide the necessary framework to expand. 
a. Representative Agency Example—Philadelphia Police 
Department PRND Program Overview 
The Philadelphia Police Department considers itself a leader in the 
Preventive Radiological/Nuclear Detection (PRND) community. Most recently, the 
Department assisted in the development of the NIMS Typing for PRND assets contained 
in Appendix C. The standard was officially published in June 2011 and the Philadelphia 
Police PRND program exceeds the standards for the highest level of capability (TYPE I). 
NIMS Type I indicates the ability to conduct a wide area radiological / nuclear search 
with the ability to deploy high resolution isotope identification.  
The Department has an extensive array of radiation detection systems that 
can be mounted on its aircraft, its watercraft, along with a variety of marked and 
unmarked patrol vehicles. The Department's Counter-Terror Operations Unit serves as 





deploys additional personnel from Patrol and Special Operations that carry Personal 
Radiation Detectors (PRD) on a 24/7 steady state basis as part of its overall PRND 
strategy.  
The department works in conjunction with the Philadelphia Fire 
Department, FBI Hazardous Materials Team, Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation 
Protection, the 3rd Civil Support Team of the Pennsylvania National Guard, AMTRAK 
Police, United States Coast Guard, and the Transportation Security Administration 
Visible Intermodal Protection and Response (VIPR) Team to provide comprehensive 
prevention and response capabilities. 
The Philadelphia Police Department was the first municipal law 
enforcement agency to participate in the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) 
program. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) through the GTRI 
Program seeks to secure radioactive material used in hospitals, universities, and industrial 
applications from potential theft and misuse. A number of sites in Philadelphia have 
received enhanced security systems and training for their employees as part of the GTRI 
Program. Alarm systems installed at these sites will be monitored at the Delaware Valley 
Intelligence Center (DVIC) when it becomes operational in 2013.  
The succeeding sections evaluate the model’s costs, its respective 
designation under the PRND NIMS Typing,90 qualitative factors, a POETE-Ops program 
evaluation, and a respective ranking compared to the other three program models 
presented. 
2. Cost Analysis 
The cost analysis, using the normalized figures presented in Appendix B of this 
document, are an approximation for the PRND capability of the Philadelphia Police 
Department's PRND Program as part of the larger UASI program. Actual costs may vary 
                                                 





from region to region, and this is best used as a planning factor for agencies considering 
starting a PRND program of this size and scope. 
 
 
PPD PRND PROGRAM: 
 Equipment:  150 PRDs    @  $1,000 each  $150,000 
           8 RIIDs     @ $20,000 each  $160,000 
           1 High Res RIID   @     $100,000 each            $100,000 
           2 Backpacks    @ $45,000 each  $ 90,000 
           1 Mobile Systems @ $100,000 each $100,000 
 Training:     400 for PRD Training    $200,000 
          50 for RIID Training (2 days)    $50,000 
          32 for Backpack Training (1 day)   $16,000  
          10 for Mobile System Training (1 day)     $5,000 
       TOTAL $871,000 
Equipment sustainment costs are approximately $26,500 per year.91 
3. NIMS Typing Analysis 
The Philadelphia PRND program meets the minimum definition of a NIMS Type 
I Law Enforcement PRND team as outlined in Appendix C of this document. They can 
field a limited number of additional Type II, III, and IV teams as needed, as well as one 
specialized Maritime PRND team, as defined in the NIMS document. They also possess 
dozens of PRDs that are deployed to field patrol units that would be considered 
“individual resources” under the NIMS typing approach. This gives the Philadelphia 
Police Department the ability to surge additional detection equipment for any steady 
state, special event, or intelligence driven scenarios as needed. These individual resource 
PRDs are also deployed around twenty GTRI-protected sites, such as hospitals and 
universities that are supported by the Type I team during response operations.  
                                                 





4. Analysis of Qualitative Factors 
Political acceptance of the PPD program and greater UASI effort is considered 
high. The department is responsible for a large portion of Southeastern Pennsylvania with 
a dense population and a multitude of special events and critical infrastructure. The 
department engages in a full spectrum of counterterrorism activities, and its PRND 
program compliments its overall strategy. Its position as the model site for the GTRI 
program gives the program a well-deserved reputation, and it routinely assists other 
police departments in initiating and sustaining PRND efforts.  
A large program, such as Philadelphia Police Department PRND effort, requires 
steady funding to ensure sustainability. This program has some advantages in this area, as 
it receives Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), Port Security Grants, and was invited 
in May 2012, as was Los Angeles, to apply to become the second region in the “Securing 
the Cities” program (STC), which is shown as the last policy option in this analysis. The 
program can easily expand into “Securing the Cities,” if accepted, as it has a solid 
framework on which to build. The GTRI effort also provides sustainment funding for the 
equipment purchased on the department's behalf. This amounts to approximately $10,000 
of the $86,000 estimated each year to maintain the program. The program has a three-
year plan for expansion by building its NIMS typing capability to ensure reiterative 
capability not just in Philadelphia but throughout the greater UASI area each year. 
5. Program Evaluation 
a. Planning—The collaborative nature of planning in the multi-
agency law enforcement program is stronger than the single agency model leading to a 
rating of BETTER. The limiting factor is that it utilizes only one discipline, law 
enforcement, and does not formerly include other response partners. 
b. Organization—As with planning, the organization of the multi-
agency PRND program is collaborative in nature by design. The Philadelphia UASI 




c. Equipment—The Philadelphia UASI program has extensive 
equipment capabilities extending to aviation and marine capabilities built over several 
years. This commitment to build capability as funding increased scores as BEST in this 
analysis.  
d. Training—The Philadelphia UASI program takes full advantage 
of DHS administered, as well as in-house, training opportunities. Its members are well 
prepared to conduct the full range of PRND related activities leading to a rating of 
BEST. 
e. Exercises—All exercises conducted by the Philadelphia UASI 
Program are multi-agency and regional in scope. Most have only involved law 
enforcement which limits the ranking to BETTER. 
f. Operations Support—The Philadelphia UASI PRND program 
utilizes the Joint Analysis Center run by DNDO in Washington, DC and the National 
Laboratories leading to a ranking of BEST. 
The Philadelphia Police Department's PRND program as the principle partner in 
the greater UASI effort is a solid, well managed entity. It is regional in scope but would 
benefit from the formal inclusion of other nonlaw enforcement organizations in 
development of policies and procedures leading to more joint operations during steady 
state conditions. Operations at special events and intelligence-based scenarios have been 
successful in the past but would only benefit from daily cooperation of additional 
agencies. As part of their “Securing the Cities” grant application, the protected region 
may be expanded to include the entire Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) that would 
integrate parts of New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland. This is the same geographic 
coverage area as the Delaware Valley Intelligence Center (DVIC).  
6. Option Analysis Summary 
Table 5 provides a cost summary and rates the interoperability and expandability 
of the representative agency program, especially if used as baseline for creating a similar 




ranking is based upon this program being a large local single agency law enforcement 
program that interacts with other regional partners including a strong public—private 
partnership with the University of Pennsylvania. The program regularly interacts with its 
federal PRND partners and has plans to expand at a steady pace as it has done since 2005. 
Although not as large as the Los Angeles PRND or as well funded, the Philadelphia 
UASI Program is strong with a sustainment plan, expandability, and is well placed to 
become the next “Securing the Cities” site.  









Interoperability Expandability Overall 
Program 
Evaluation
1 $600,000 $271,000 $86,000 YES YES BETTER 
 
D. WORKING WITH ALL RESPONSE PARTNERS—A MULTI-
DISCIPLINE PRND PROGRAM 
1. Program Overview—New York City Regional “Securing The Cities” 
Initiative PRND Program 
The May 7, 2012 Federal Grant announcement concerning the expansion of the 
STC program described the effort as: 
The Securing the Cities (STC) Program seeks to design and implement or 
enhance existing architectures for coordinated and integrated detection and 
interdiction of nuclear materials that are out of regulatory control and may 
be used as a weapon within high-risk metropolitan areas in the United 
States. The STC Program will establish sustainable capability among 
State, local and tribal agencies to detect and report unauthorized nuclear 
materials within their jurisdictions supporting the Global Nuclear 
Detection Architecture (GNDA). The STC Program has three primary 
goals: (1) to enhance regional capabilities to detect, identify and interdict 
nuclear materials that are out of regulatory control; (2) to guide the 
coordination of Federal, State, local and tribal entities in their roles 
defined by the GNDA; and (3) to encourage participants to sustain base 




The program began in 2006 in the New York City Region and encompasses 
portions of three states: New York, New Jersey and Connecticut. This area forms a forty-
five (45) mile buffer zone around New York City in which radiological detection 
equipment is deployed on a daily basis. The New York City Police Department (NYPD) 
is the primary of thirteen (13) principle participants that include other law enforcement 
agencies, the New York City Fire Department (FDNY), and traditional radiation safety 
professionals. In total, over 150 agencies are involved in program, most are smaller law 
enforcement departments in the region that are managed by the New Jersey State Police 
and other larger organizations on behalf of NYPD.  
The thirteen (13) principle partners are: 
• New York City Police Department 
• New York City Department of Environmental Protection 
• New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 
• New York City Fire Department 
• New York State Police / Office of Homeland Security 
• Suffolk County, New York, Police Department 
• Nassau County, New York, Police Department 
• Westchester County, New York, Department of Public Safety 
• Rockland County, New York, Sheriff’s Department 
• New Jersey State Police 
• Port Authority of New York / New Jersey 
• Metropolitan Transit Authority 
• Connecticut State Police  
In addition to 1000 PRDs, 100 Radiation Detection Backpacks and five Mobile 




House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security in July, 201192 that the 
following equipment had been distributed throughout the NYC region: 
• 4,200 + Personal Radiation Detectors (PRDs) 
• 156 Radiation Detection Backpacks 
• 77 Radiological Isotope Identification Devices (RIIDs) 
• 15 Mobile Detection Systems 
In addition, several thousand personnel have been trained and a network of 400 
check/chokepoints have been identified and exercised as pathways into the city for 
coverage in an activation of all PRND resources. Steady state operations are conducted 
throughout the region twenty-four hours a day. A common set of equipment purchases, 
operational procedures and training programs ensures consistent coverage and response 
protocols in the three state region protected by the STC program.  
The program was slated to be a five year pilot program but, through political 
maneuvering and the fact that New York City remains the top target in the nation, it has 
achieved permanent funding status. Funding from 2006 to date has surpassed $60 million 
dollars.  
a. Representative Agency Example—Suffolk County Police 
Department PRND Program Overview 93 
Suffolk County is located on the eastern portion of Long Island, New 
York. It has a population of just under 1.5 million people, and it is 2,373 square miles 
including 912 square miles of land area and 1461 square miles of water. It is the second 
largest county in New York State. The county has extensive shoreline area, and it is 
divided into ten townships. The Suffolk County Police Department was created in 1960 
and combined numerous town and village police departments into one consolidated 
county department that provides primary patrol service for the majority of the county and 
                                                 
92 Daddario, July 2011. 
93 Information provided by Inspector Stuart Cameron, Suffolk County Police Department’s PRND 
Program Manager. Inspector Cameron, and the author, have worked collectively on PRND issues since 




some specialized services to the entire county. The department has approximately 2,600 
sworn members, and it is one of the larger police departments in the United States. 
In 2004, the department created a preventive radiation detection program 
as part of its ongoing homeland security efforts. Four hundred personal radiation 
detectors (PRDs) were purchased utilizing federal homeland security grant funding. The 
department’s Emergency Service Section already possessed radiological isotope 
identification devices (RIIDS) and various radiological survey devices as part of their 
county-wide hazardous material team responsibilities. In addition to being the county’s 
hazardous materials team, the Emergency Service Section is also the department’s public 
safety bomb squad, SWAT team and it is tasked with performing various other special 
operations including heavy rescue and technical rescue. 
In 2007, the Securing the Cities (STC) program was started by the 
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. This program, funded at over $100 million to date, 
provides training and equipment to twelve principal agencies and various subpartners 
located around New York City. Suffolk County is one of the twelve principal partners, 
and has therefore, received support for training, equipment and exercises. Due to the 
support from STC and continued use of other federal grants, there are now close to 800 
personal radiation detectors deployed throughout Suffolk County with twenty-three law 
enforcement agencies, including state, county, town and village departments. The 
program continues to build out, adding new training, equipment and tactics to ensure that 
this mission is performed in the most efficient and effective manner possible.  
The succeeding sections will evaluate the model’s costs, its respective 
designation under the PRND NIMS Typing,94 qualitative factors, a POETE-Ops program 
evaluation, and a respective ranking compared to the other three program models 
presented. 
                                                 





2. Cost Analysis 
The cost analysis following, using the normalized figures presented in Appendix 
B of this document, are an approximation of the PRND capability of the Suffolk County 
Police Department's PRND Program as part of the larger “Securing the Cities” effort in 
the New York City Region. Actual costs may vary from region to region, and this is best 
used as a planning factor for agencies considering starting a PRND program of this size 
and scope. 
 
SUFFOLK COUNTY POLICE PRND PROGRAM 
 Equipment:  764 PRDs   @  $1,000 each  $764,000 
           8 RIIDs    @ $20,000 each  $160,000 
           1 High Res RIID  @       $100,000 each            $100,000 
           7 Backpacks   @ $45,000 each  $315,000 
           3 Mobile Systems @ $100,000 each $300,000 
 Training:     2500 for PRD Training    $1,250,000 
          50 for RIID Training (2 days)    $50,000 
          50 for Backpack Training (1 day)   $25,000  
          50 for Mobile System Training (1 day)   $25,000 
       TOTAL $2,989,000 
Equipment sustainment costs are approximately $102,900 per year.95 
3. NIMS Typing Analysis 
The Suffolk County Police Department’s PRND program easily meets the 
definition of a NIMS Type I Law Enforcement PRND team as outlined in Appendix C of 
this document. They can field a number of additional Type II, III, and IV teams as 
needed, as well as specialized maritime PRND teams defined in the NIMS document. 
They also possess hundreds of PRDs that are deployed to field patrol units that would be 
                                                 





considered “individual resources” under the NIMS typing approach. This gives SCPD the 
ability to surge detection equipment for steady state, special event, and intelligence 
driven scenarios throughout the greater New York City area.  
4. Analysis of Qualitative Factors 
New York City continues to be widely viewed as the primary target for terrorism, 
and programs such as STC enjoy wide political support and acceptance, as evidenced by 
the permanent extension of STC well beyond the initial five-year pilot program mandate. 
Obviously, such a large program has incurred tremendous start-up and 
sustainment costs. It would have been difficult to sustain this effort beyond the five-year 
period in the initial grant without continued funding. The recent competitive 
announcement for a second program site also recognizes the needed for a sustainment 
effort and jurisdictions should prepare for those costs beyond the grant life. That is a 
difficult challenge in tight budgetary conditions and many jurisdictions will find that 
impossible.  
5. Program Evaluation 
Planning—The “Securing the Cities” program uses a comprehensive model to 
planning that leads to input and representation of all principle partner agencies. This truly 
collaborative model ranks as BEST. 
Organization—The committee-style organization of the STC program ensures 
that each partner agency has a clearly defined role in the overall effort. Each discipline 
contributes to respective committees leading to a ranking of BEST. 
Equipment—Equipment is standardized across the program leading to true multi-
discipline interoperability and increased efficiency in procurement leading to a ranking of 
BEST in this analysis.  
Training—Training is standardized across the program leading to true multi-
discipline cooperation and increased efficiency in training delivery and management 




Exercises—Exercises are conducted regionally with all disciplines represented 
ensuring each respective partner agency is well practiced in their role in the PRND effort. 
This is the most robust exercise model of all options shown and is ranked accordingly as 
BEST. 
f. Operations Support—The STC program utilizes the Joint Analysis 
Center managed by DNDO in Washington, DC and the National Laboratories leading to a 
ranking of BEST. 
This option can be viewed as the optimal conditions for the domestic portion of 
the GNDA: Multiple response and prevention partners working together over a large 
geographic area with common equipment, training, and procedures. The downside with 
such a large program is that absent continued funding it is extremely difficult to sustain. 
Agencies involved should closely monitor long term sustainment costs in the event that 
federal funding diminishes and begin to plan for that in all aspects of their homeland 
security programs, not just PRND efforts.  
6. Option Analysis Overview 
The “Securing the Cities” program represents the paragon of excellence in PRND 
programs. It encompasses a multi-agency, and multi-disciplinary approach to radiological 
/ nuclear terrorism prevention that is difficult to match without the large infusion of grant 
funds made available by the program. Expandability, as shown here, would involve 
linking this region to another STC region, such as Boston, Philadelphia, or the National 
Capital Region to further build the defense-in-depth approach envisioned as the domestic 
portion of the GNDA.  
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Radiological and nuclear terrorism prevention is increased by steadily adding to 
the domestic layer of the GNDA. This expansion as discussed herein is intended to 
increase the number of local law enforcement agencies undertaking PRND activities 
alone or in concert with others in their region.  
This chapter has examined the four policy options in some degree of detail to 
provide decision makers with informed criteria for selecting a program that complements 
their existing homeland security objectives. These case studies further illustrate examples 
of how several jurisdictions approached their entry into the preventive efforts. 
Each of the four options has unique characteristics relating to cost, capability, 
sustainability, and expandability. The final chapter will outline the general findings of 
this thesis as well as concluding remarks and a series of recommendations for agencies 
















































V. FINDINGS, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. FINDINGS 
This research has examined the role of law enforcement as a domestic layer of an 
international effort known as the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA). The 
GNDA seeks to prevent the theft, movement, and use of radiological/nuclear materials by 
terrorists.  
The research seeks to encourage additional law enforcement agencies to adopt 
Preventive Radiological/Nuclear Detection (PRND) programs as part of their 
jurisdiction’s overall homeland security effort that values the presence of a well-trained, 
well-equipped and situationally aware law enforcement officers. The existing literature 
was reviewed, acknowledging that a radiological / nuclear attack is one of the more 
unlikely terrorism scenarios, albeit it with high consequences worthy of proactive 
preventive measures.  
Four general policy options were introduced for law enforcement decision makers 
to choose the best course of action considerate of their unique needs and limitations. The 
comparative costs associated with each program were examined. The core management 
principles were delineated and ranked as LIMITED, GOOD, BETTER, and BEST. 
Several of the policy options have a wide range of rankings giving managers the ability to 
blend program types where applicable and create hybrid options not specifically 
analyzed. 
The succeeding sections contain a tabular recap of the findings, a conclusion, and 
a series of recommendations. It is hoped that a law enforcement agency of any size, 
regardless of whether they begin a formal program or not, can take away lessons and 
strategies that can be instituted in their operations. Several of the recommendations can 
be implemented for little or no cost and serve to raise awareness of the threat. 
B. PROGRAM MATRIX 

















PRND VARIES VARIES VARIES LIMITED YES LIMITED
       
Single 
Agency $1,755,000 $274,500 $86,000 YES YES GOOD 
       
Multi-
Agency $600,000 $271,000 $86,000 YES YES BETTER 





$1,639,000 $1,350,000 $102,900 YES YES BEST 
Table 8 summarizes the findings of the analysis found in the previous chapter. 
Table 8.   Analysis Matrix (POETE-Ops) 
Program 




PRND LIMITED LIMITED LIMITED LIMITED LIMITED BEST 
       
Single 
Agency GOOD GOOD BEST GOOD GOOD BEST 
       
Multi-
Agency BETTER BETTER BEST BEST BETTER BEST 










Since September 11, 2001, American policing has undergone a fundamental 
transformation. Traditional crime fighting and the public service mission have been 
expanded to include roles in the homeland security enterprise. Matters once thought to be 
squarely within the domain of the United States Government as part of national security 
have become commonplace at the local level. The area of nuclear and radiological 
terrorism prevention is an example of this transformation. Most law enforcement officers 
beginning their careers prior to 9/11/01 would never have envisioned an expanded role in 
this area, let alone, involving carrying radiation detection equipment as part of their 
normal patrol duties. An attack of this nature is truly a “black swan” by definition—an 
extremely remote possibility but with staggeringly high consequences. The successful 
detonation of a nuclear weapon within the United States would change our country on a 
scale unimaginable at this time. A lesser impact would be the use of a radiological 
dispersal device or RDD, but even that could cost billions to clean up and years from 
which to recover.  
The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture attempts to create a multi-pronged 
“defense in depth” strategy to increase the probability of detection and project a 
deterrence effect to cause a potential adversary a moment of pause to reconsider if such 
an attack is likely to succeed. This thesis posits that law enforcement adds a distinctive, if 
not even the last, layer of this worldwide effort. By harnessing law enforcement’s unique 
blend of familiar crime fighting, community policing, and terrorism response skills they 
add greatly to the domestic front of nuclear and radiation terrorism prevention.  
There are expenses associated with this effort. In terms of personnel, training, 
procuring equipment and sustainment, costs can be substantial. Some agencies may find 
their involvement cost prohibitive and chose to leave the mission to federal forces. 
Economic struggles and competing attention with more traditional crime prevention and 
response duties will tax some agencies' personnel to the point where this additional duty 
is not practical. Others will choose a policy option presented here and join the PRND 




scope as shown in the research. Every case study used is scalable. Larger agencies and 
their programs were used as examples but the management aspects apply to departments 
of every geographical and personnel size. The principle missions—Steady—State, 
Enhanced Steady State/Special Event, and Intelligence-Driven search operations—are 
found in every community in varying degrees. The knowledge that such operations exist 
at the federal level may raise awareness in some departments. They can, in turn, at least 
minimally plan for support and participation if the need arises in their communities.  
The law enforcement agencies, some of which have been used as case studies in 
this thesis, that decided to embrace this mission have added to the layered defense and 
protection of our nation as envisioned by the GNDA. Increasing that number of agencies 
only heightens the probability of detection and enhances all of law enforcement's roles in 
homeland security and defense, regardless of the PRND option utilized. 
Agencies are strongly encouraged to educate their personnel on the reality of 
radiological and nuclear threats, locate and liaise with sites and organizations that store 
and use radioactive material, and assist in the physical security and response to those 
sites. They must also partner with agencies actively pursuing the PRND mission, and 
assist in providing an ever increasing blanket of overlapping detection and deterrent 
capability. This recommended strategy is expressed as PREPARE, PROTECT, 
PARTNER, and PROVIDE. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Prepare 
The first step in this process is to make the decision that it worthwhile for the law 
enforcement agency to engage in PRND efforts. This can take several forms and does not 
necessarily entail creating a formal PRND program like those shown in this thesis. Many 
of those agencies began at this step of preparation and logically grew as funding and 
capabilities expanded, increasing steadily toward their current state.  
An agency can begin by educating its employees about the threat of nuclear and 




accessed on FEMA’s website (www.fema.gov) that cover awareness level material. The 
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is in the process of creating training products aimed 
at executive leaders and elected officials in a similar focus. If the majority of law 
enforcement officers took as little as two hours to educate themselves on the threat, 
became more aware of the materials that are used and transported within and around their 
communities, it would increase the probability of detection and enhance the deterrence 
factor without the purchase of a single piece of equipment.  
The next step would be for an agency to locate and develop a relationship with 
sites and organizations that use, store, or transport nuclear and radioactive materials. 
These include hospitals, universities, industrial sites, government laboratories, power 
generating stations, and waste facilities. It is advantageous to have an existing 
relationship and discuss mutual concerns such as emergency response to the site before to 
an incident occurs. Patrol officers making random unscheduled visits to these sites can 
discourage the “insider” threat discussed in the background section. If employees see 
there is a strong relationship between law enforcement and their organization, they may 
be more encouraged to share intelligence and information and be deterred from becoming 
involved in a terrorism event. Similar to awareness training mentioned previously, the 
relationship component is cost neutral and can singularly increase the strategic goals of 
the GNDA.  
2. Protect 
Once the education and liaison steps are fulfilled, the path continues to protection 
of the sites and the community served by the law enforcement agencies. The National 
Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is 
a program mentioned several times in this document. It seeks to add voluntary, 
government funded, security upgrades to physical locations that store and use radioactive 
materials that could be used to make a radiological dispersal device (RDD). The most 
common type of sites involved in the program are hospitals with Cesium or Cobalt blood 
irradiators. The GTRI program also provides training and equipment, such as personal 




protection and response to the site. The program provides training on how to use the 
PRDs as well as a three-year maintenance, calibration, and sustainment program to offset 
costs to the agency. Several programs evaluated in this document benefited greatly from 
this initiative and built their capability by being involved in NNSA’s effort to secure 
vulnerable sites across the nation. Agencies are strongly encouraged to explore this as an 
option to begin or augment their PRND efforts. 
3. Partner 
Collaboration is cited throughout the homeland security enterprise as critical and 
is equally important in the Preventive Radiological / Nuclear Detection (PRND) program 
model. In the recommendations above, locating and establishing a relationship with at-
risk sites in their patrol areas begins the process of partnering. It is further enhanced by 
inclusion in the GTRI program if available in the respective jurisdiction. If not, agencies 
should consider initiating a smaller effort—a NIMS Type IV or nontyped operation by 
placing several PRDs in the hands of patrol personnel. By establishing a relationship with 
other response agencies such as fire, hazardous materials, radiation safety professionals, 
or the National Guard Civil Support Team, a program can expand through the 
collaboration and costs spread across several budgets. The NIMS Typing document in 
Appendix C provides more information on joint multi-disciplinary PRND teams. It has 
been stressed throughout this thesis that law enforcement agencies make critical additions 
to this effort and inclusion in existing nonlaw enforcement efforts can be a powerful force 
multiplier. If equipment cannot be acquired due to funding or other constraints, agencies 
should strongly consider providing personnel to existing detection efforts implemented 
by other organizations to add the interviewing/interrogation, arrest/detention, and use of 
force expertise not indigenous to other disciplines. This again represents a low or no cost 
option for inclusion in nationwide PRND efforts and benefits all the agencies involved 
whether public safety and emergency response driven or private sector sites seeking 





By educating agency personnel, partnering with other public and private 
organizations, deploying detection and interdiction personnel, law enforcement provides 
another layer of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. The GNDA begins overseas 
by protecting sites in foreign countries storing at-risk material, then protects our borders 
by scanning cargo at foreign ports and domestic border crossings, but truly ends in the 
realm of America’s police whose inclusion provides a unique blend of traditional crime 
fighting with a role in national security. 
Agencies should strongly consider examining the PRND programs detailed in this 
document, find a starting point and begin involvement in the prevention of nuclear and 
radiation terrorism. The first three steps can be scaled as funding and personnel resources 
are available and not every agency needs to develop a NIMS Type I PRND operation. It 
is acknowledged that substantial financial resources are involved in several programs 
contained herein and most jurisdictions do not have access to that level of homeland 
security funding. All agencies can find a role whether it be awareness training or building 
relationships with existing stakeholders. 
America’s police have a long and proud history of protecting its communities and 
citizenry. It transformed itself in the wake of the tragedy of September 11 and rose to the 
new mission of terrorism prevention as well as crime related and public safety duties. Its 
members significantly contribute to the PRND mission and fill a critical function in the 
GNDA. By taking an active role in these operations, they may very well prevent the most 
horrific attack that our nation has ever endured. Law enforcement officers serve as 





E. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Legal Aspects of Preventive Radiological Nuclear Detection 
Operations 
One view of Preventive Radiological / Nuclear Detection not discussed in this 
thesis addresses the legality of these operations. This thesis solely concentrates on 
program development options from a capability and equipment standard comparison. The 
fundamental reason that there is no comment on the legal perspective is that, as of 
publication, there is no case law at the local, state, or federal level. Different local and 
state legal advisors have implemented varying policies throughout the nation. A Naval 
Postgraduate School colleague from the Transportation Security Administration is 
currently conducting research in this area and the body of knowledge will surely benefit 
from its conclusions. 
2. New Technologies for Enhancing Law Enforcement Training for the 
Radiological/Nuclear Threat 
This thesis concentrated on costs associated with the initial purchase and training 
for various types of detection equipment used by law enforcement agencies engaged in 
the PRND mission. It also included estimates for maintenance and calibration of 
equipment to sustain its operation. Not fully addressed here is the recurring personnel 
training for the PRND mission especially in light of the remote nature of an actual event 
occurring.  
Currently, there are educational opportunities that provide introductory training 
and some agencies have used those on a repeated basis to ensure competency with the 
equipment. There are several initiatives for dedicated recertification training including 
web-based and “first person shooter” type virtual reality simulations. It is important to 
note that many younger first responders in all disciplines are likely to expect to receive 
some training in methods that are not readily available (e.g., self administered web-based 
or interactive training). Their respective benefits and shortcomings deserve their own 





readiness despite a lack of real world incidents to model. Nuclear and radiological 
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APPENDIX A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION: NUCLEAR AND 
RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM 
Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism are part of the spectrum of threats faced 
today in the United States. Law Enforcement plays a vital role in protecting the homeland 
against the entire array of possible attack scenarios.  
This section will define and outline the various aspects of nuclear and radiological 
terrorism including definitions, history, groups associated with, types of weapons 
possible, and strategies to counter the threat beginning globally but ending with a role for 
local law enforcement.  
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) defines terrorism as: 
Terrorism is the use of force or violence against persons or property in violation 
of the laws of the United States for purposes of intimidation, coercion, or ransom. 
Terrorists often use threats to: 
(4) Create fear among the public. 
(5) Try to convince citizens that their government is powerless to prevent 
terrorism. 
(6) Get immediate publicity for their causes. 
Acts of terrorism include threats of terrorism; assassinations; kidnappings; 
hijackings; bomb scares and bombings; cyber attacks (computer-based); and the use of 
chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological weapons.96 
As is shown in the above definition, there are incidents that may involve 
Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, Radiological, and Explosive agents. These five types of 
terrorism provide for the acronym CBRNE terrorism. There are specific challenges and 
considerations to each piece of the CBRNE threat spectrum. Definitions for Nuclear and 
Radiological terrorism are shown below. 
                                                 




Nuclear Terrorism is defined as the use or threat of use of a nuclear explosive 
device of any type by an individual or a group for terrorist purposes. A nuclear explosive 
device is defined as a device capable of producing an explosive yield through a nuclear 
chain reaction.97 
Radiological terrorism is defined as the use or threat of use of radiation for 
terrorist purposes by means of such methods as a radiological dispersal device (RDD), or 
“dirty bomb,” that would disperse radioactive substances, for example. Other methods 
include sabotage of nuclear-power plants, nuclear research units, or other nuclear 
facilities with the goal of causing a dispersal of radioactive material. The fundamental 
difference between nuclear and radiological terrorism is that the latter does not feature 
production of a nuclear yield achieved through a nuclear chain reaction.98 
It should be noted that the vast amount of CBRNE terrorism events that occur are 
explosive in nature. The National Counterterrorism Center's (NCTC) 2009 Report on 
Terrorism states there were approximately 11,000 terrorist attacks carried out in 83 
countries resulting in over 58,000 victims.99 Armed assaults topped the list of types of 
attacks with 4,832 incidents followed by bombings with incidents totaling 4,050.100 
There were no incidents of Nuclear or Radiological terrorism in the 2009 report. Why 
then should the United States expend effort in curtailing the possibility of a nuclear or 
radiological attack? Quite simply, because the effect of a single well placed attack could 
be of such magnitude that all other attacks in recent history would pale in comparison. A 
recent Congressional Research Report stated, “Cleanup costs after an RDD (Radiological 
Dispersal Device) attack could range from less than a billion dollars to tens of billions of 
dollars depending on area contaminated, decontamination technologies used, and level of  
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clean up required.”101 Another factor to consider unique to radiological and nuclear 
materials is that the existing public fear of radiation would intensify the effect on the 
nation's psyche.  
Two final definitions are needed prior to continuing the discussion of Nuclear and 
Radiological terrorism. Those remaining are the definitions of nuclear and radiological 
materials and their uses, since they are often confusing to the public and policy makers 
alike.  
Nuclear Materials—often referred to as “special nuclear materials (SNM): 
“Special nuclear material” (SNM) is defined by Title I of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
as plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium enriched in the isotopes uranium-233 or uranium-
235.102 To the lay person, these are materials that can be used to cause nuclear explosions 
like the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan at the end of World War II. 
Radioactive Materials—materials that contain radioactive atoms. Radioactive 
atoms are unstable; that is, they have too much energy. When radioactive atoms 
spontaneously release their extra energy, they are said to decay. All radioactive atoms 
decay eventually, though they do not all decay at the same rate. After releasing all their 
excess energy, the atoms become stable and are no longer radioactive. The time required 
for decay depends upon the type of atom.103 These materials are used in industry and 
medicine and cannot be used to create a nuclear explosion. However, they can be used 
with explosives to spread contamination.  
The historical record for this type of terrorism is limited. The only use of nuclear 
weapons outside of testing was done by the United States at the end of World War II. A 
threat assessment report produced by Harvard University's Belfer Center outlined three 
organizations that expressed interest in pursuing nuclear weapons as a terrorism 
objective. They are Al-Qaeda, North Caucasus Groups in the former Soviet Union, and 
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the Japanese terror cult Aum Shinrikyo.104 None of the groups are believed to have 
successfully acquired or produced weapons but have shown an interest in obtaining them. 
Acquisition (including purchase of a nuclear weapon by terrorists) from a nuclear-armed 
country will also be discussed.  
Radiological terrorism can be illustrated in a November1995 incident in 
Chechnya when rebels partially buried a container with a small quantity of cesium-137 in 
Moscow's Ismailovsky Park. The Chechen leader then notified a Russian television crew, 
which located the container. This is the first widely reported incident of radiological 
terrorism. 105  
Again, it can be asked if there is little or no history of this type of terrorism then 
why is it such a concern to the United States? An answer can be evidenced in the 
following: 
The joint United States and Russia threat assessment concludes, “Nuclear 
terrorism is a real and urgent threat. Given the potentially catastrophic consequences, 
even a small probability of terrorists getting and detonating a nuclear bomb is enough to 
justify urgent action to reduce the risk.”106 
Two of the fifteen “National Planning Scenarios” involved nuclear and 
radiological terrorism. The Federal Emergency Management Website describes the 
purpose of the scenarios—“The fifteen all-hazards National Planning Scenarios are an 
integral component of DHS’s capabilities-based approach to implementing Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 8: National Preparedness (HSPD-8). The scenarios serve 
as the foundation for the development of homeland security tasks, target capabilities, and 
standards and performance metrics against which capabilities and tasks will ultimately be 
measured. The scenario-derived capabilities and standards serve as a basis for assessing  
 
                                                 
104 The U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Nuclear Terrorism (2011), 10–11. 
105 Nuclear Threat Initiative Website.www.nti.org . 




national preparedness; help guide federal preparedness assistance to state, local, and 
tribal governments; and assist in development of national exercises and training 
programs.”107 The descriptions of both are below: 
National Planning Scenario #1: terrorist members of the Universal Adversary 
(UA) group plan to assemble a gun-type nuclear device using highly enriched uranium 
(HEU) stolen from a nuclear facility in another country. The nuclear device components 
are smuggled into the United States, and the device is assembled near a major 
metropolitan center. Using a delivery van, terrorists plan to transport the device to the 
business district of a large city and detonate it.108 
National Planning Scenario #11: the Universal Adversary (UA) purchases stolen 
cesium chloride (CsCl) to make a radiological dispersal device (RDD), or “dirty bomb.” 
The explosive and the shielded cesium-137 (137Cs) sources are smuggled into the 
country. Detonator cord is stolen from a mining operation, and all other materials are 
obtained legally in the United States. Devices are detonated in three separate, but 
regionally close, moderate-to-large cities.109 
Two recent United States government publications underscore this concern 
despite a successful occurrence of nuclear or radiological terrorism having taken place. 
The first is the June,2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism which states “The 
danger of nuclear terrorism is the greatest threat to global security.”110 The second is the 
recently released Department of Homeland Security report outlining progress on 
implementing the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. The original 9/11 report 
recommended, “Strengthen counter proliferation efforts to prevent radiological/nuclear 
terrorism”111 and the progress report gives reinforcement with the following progress 
statement: “Countering nuclear, biological, and radiological threats requires a 
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coordinated, whole-of government approach. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 
(DNDO)—formed in 2005 as part of DHS—works in partnership with agencies across 
federal, state and local government to prevent and deter attacks using nuclear and 
radiological weapons through nuclear detection and forensics programs and activities.”112  
To summarize this section, it is easy to assume that the threat of a successful 
nuclear or radiological terrorism event would be remote. However, the aftermath would 
be so catastrophic that a prevention strategy is essential. Ted Lewis advocates an “80–20” 
rule in his book, “Bak's Sand Pile” where a nation would invest 80 percent in prevention 
and 20 percent in response for hazards with high risk profiles.”113 Nuclear and 
radiological terrorism certainly have a high risk profile although being rare events in 
general. This would support our government's effort in the prevention of this type of 
terrorism as envisioned in the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) and law 
enforcement's participation in its objectives discussed in Part Two of this document. 
There are four basic types of attacks that a terrorist group could employ in the 
nuclear and radiological terrorism realm. Each has advantages and disadvantages 
requiring slightly different methods for detection and interdiction. They are listed below 
and will be followed by a description and narrative discussing some issues in obtaining 
and carrying out an attack. 
The four possibilities are: 
(1) Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) 
(2) Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) 
(3) Radiological Exposure Device (RED) 
(4) Hoax 
Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)- The most devastating of all possibilities, this is 
a fully functioning weapon capable of a nuclear explosion. These would be constructed 
using highly enriched uranium or plutonium and following basic designs that have been 
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in use for almost 70 years. The device in National Planning Scenario #1 had a yield of 10 
kilotons of TNT and was estimated to cause 100,000 casualties.114 That yield is 
conservative reflecting a base model IND nowhere near the destructive capabilities of 
weapons in American and Russian arsenals. There are eight nations that possess nuclear 
weapons: United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, France, Israel, India, and Pakistan. 
North Korea and Iran are believed to be in varying levels of development.  
Existing weapons could be stolen, although that would represent an extreme 
event, as security is a paramount concern to the nuclear nations. One country, Pakistan, 
does concern some due to recent events questioning the stability of their government. A 
recent report from Global Security Newswire commented on a scenario involving 
diversion of Special Nuclear Material (SNM), as opposed to completed weapon115. That 
would be a more plausible option but would require an “insider” to assist and facilitate 
the process. The acquisition of weapons grade SNM is the biggest obstacle in the 
construction of an IND, if a completed weapon is not available. North Korea and Iran 
could sell a weapon to terrorists but most discount that as unlikely because such 
transactions can be traced back to them and would certainly result in retaliation from the 
United States and its allies. 
Zimmerman and Lewis state that for a mere $5,433,000, a weapon could be built 
(including purchasing weapons grade material on the black market) and used against a 
United States target. 116 
In summary, INDs have the strongest impact but maintains the least probability 
for nuclear and radiological terrorism. Perhaps triggering a re-application of the 80–20 
rule where 20 percent of prevention efforts are focused on the IND threat and 80 percent 
on the remaining threats would be wise. 
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Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)—This represents a much simpler project 
for a terrorist organization to undertake. In this option, conventional explosives are 
coupled with a radioactive material and the explosion causes the radioactive material to 
be spread over a wider area resulting in contamination. There would likely be few deaths, 
other than from the direct effects of the explosion, and most damage would be economic 
due to clean up costs. These are often referred to as “weapons of mass disruption” due to 
the economic impact versus the immediate causalities of an IND. It is important to 
remember that the essential element to a RDD is the dispersal of radioactive material to 
create contamination. Therefore, a RDD attack can be accomplished without explosives 
by dispersing as a powder into a ventilation system of a building or merely into the air, or 
mixing a powdered material with water and spraying it.  
The only hurdle for a terrorist organization is obtaining the radioactive material. 
Since they are not seeking Special Nuclear Material (SNM) the choices are more 
abundant and available. There are several industrial and medical radioactive materials 
that would work well in an RDD. For discussion purposes this paper will examine two: 
Cobalt 60 and Cesium 137. Both are strong industrial sources that emit gamma radiation, 
which in great amounts is harmful to human beings. 
Again, to limit the discussion, one application will be cited where Cobalt and 
Cesium are used. That use is radioactive materials being used as blood irradiators, which 
are used in hospitals and universities to sterilize blood and other tissues for transfusions 
and other research. It can be agreed that security is reduced in these settings compared to 
a nuclear power plant or facility where weapons are stored. They may be seen as “soft 
targets” by terrorists due to the public nature of the facilities. Ken Sheely, from the 
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), estimates that there over 2,700 sites 
in the United States where these materials are used.117 The NNSA is providing security 
upgrades to many of these facilities through its Global Threat Reduction Initiative 
(GTRI).   
                                                 




An interesting case to examine in the discussion of RDDs involves an incident 
from Goiania, Brazil in 1987 where a Cesium 137 source was removed from an 
abandoned medical facility and spread through the community as a curiosity. There was 
no attempt to deliberately disperse the material yet the effects included 4 fatalities, 23 
serious injuries from radiation exposure, 129 persons contaminated from the Cesium and 
112,800 persons screened for exposure.118 Goiania is often cited as an example for RDD 
planning. The effects of a deliberate dispersal would obviously be several orders of 
magnitude higher. 
Radiation Exposure Device (RED—This is the simplest form of an actual attack 
for a group interested in nuclear and radiological terrorism. Materials like Cesium or 
Cobalt described above are placed in a public area exposing people passing by. There 
would not likely be any immediate symptoms from the radiation exposure and the 
perpetrators would notify the media to help spread public concern. This type of attack is 
similar to the November, 1995 event described earlier in Chechnya where Cesium was 
placed in a public park and the media was alerted. Methods to obtain the material needed 
mirror those used in the RDD acquisition, which again would be easier than in the case of 
an IND. 
Hoax—It cannot be discounted in this discussion that a well-executed hoax where 
there is no device or material has the potential for terror, as well. A group without the 
resources to obtain radioactive material or other attention seekers could perpetrate a hoax 
causing resources to be allocated for its investigation. This can be magnified through 
notification to the media to raise public alarm and concern. In the Goiania incident 
described above, once it became public knowledge that material had been spread through 
the community almost 113,000 people sought screening.119 Imagine what the effect 
would be in a United States city if residents thought they had been exposed to radiation 
either through an RDD or RED.  
                                                 





A well-planned IND/RDD hoax in a major United States city could cause the 
deployment of several federal, state, and local teams and result in several days of search 
efforts until declared a hoax by federal officials. It would likely be determined that search 









































APPENDIX B. PREVENTIVE RADIOLOGICAL/NUCLEAR 
DETECTION MISSIONS, EQUIPMENT TYPES AND 
CAPABILITIES 
A. PREVENTIVE RADIOLOGICAL/NUCLEAR DETECTION MISSION 
TYPES 
1. Radiological Material Site Protection / Response 
This mission involves identifying locations such as hospitals, universities, and 
industrial sites that use and/or store radioactive materials in their daily functions. 
Locations where Cesium 137 and Cobalt 60 are most interesting because they possess the 
most likely useable material for a “dirty bomb,” as described earlier in Appendix A.  
2. Steady State Patrol Operations 
These are routine patrol operations where detection equipment is deployed with 
the officers minus intelligence or threat information. The deployment can be foot patrol, 
vehicle patrol, or utilizing airborne and marine assets. Detection is accomplished through 
the use of Personal Radiation Detectors (PRDs), sometimes referred to as “radiation 
pagers.” They are typically worn on the officer's gun belt and they alert the officer to the 
presence of radiation that may require investigation, a process that will be discussed in a 
later section. Vehicle-based systems,  including law enforcement air and marine craft, 
will carry larger, more advanced detection equipment to cover larger patrol areas more 
efficiently.  
a. Special Event / Enhanced Steady State 
These are operations that mirror steady state but are focused on special 
events. These events range from a local venue like a parade or county fair to large 
national events like the Super Bowl and World Series. There are some nuances to tactics 
particular to special events that dictate the differentiation between steady state and 






b. Intelligence Driven Search Operations 
This is the deployment of PRND assets in conjunction to a threat or 
gathered intelligence. It may be conducted in a low visibility or covert manner. It may 
involve integration of many agencies from federal, state, and local organizations 
depending on the area involved and specifics of the threat. Again, this mission has 
operational differences from Steady State and Enhanced Steady State although it is 
important to note that during threat conditions, a mix of all three missions may be 
employed for maximum deterrence. 
c. Common Mission Activities 
Within the three missions listed above are three core activities for law 
enforcement agencies involved in PRND activities. The three activities are: 
- Primary Screening 
-Secondary Screening 
- Technical Reach-Back   
(1) Primary Screening 
Primary Screening occurs when an officer is alerted by their 
detection equipment of the presence of radiological or nuclear material. The officer will 
attempt to verify the alarm, locate the source of the detection, and determine if it is a 
threat or not. The vast majority of law enforcement encounters with the public in primary 
screening are with persons who have had a medical or diagnostic procedure involving 
placing radioactive materials inside their body. The most likely event is a cardiac stress 
test involving an injection of the isotope Technetium 99. Patients may be detectable for 
several days afterward and from some distance away, and may present a letter from a 
doctor or hospital outlining the procedure. Some will not even be aware they have 
radioactive material in their body and that detectors are able to “see” them. Primary 
screening is the proverbial “needle in the haystack” scenario where officers must sort 
through legitimate sources looking for an illicit one. Most primary screening encounters 
are accomplished through an interview. This is when law enforcement officers have a 




interviews, interrogations, deception detection, behavioral analysis, and intuition that 
gives them a clear edge in primary screening activities. 
(2) Secondary Screening 
Secondary Screening occurs when the primary screener cannot 
determine through the interview process whether the radiation detection is legitimate. 
Specialized personnel from a different discipline may respond with more sophisticated 
equipment to determine the type and source and the detection. In some jurisdictions, Fire 
Department Hazardous Materials Teams or State Radiation Control officials perform this 
function. Most seasoned law enforcement PRND programs, such as New York City, 
Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Washington, DC have officers that routinely perform 
secondary screening without such assistance. 
(3) Technical Reach-Back  
Technical Reach-Back occurs when secondary screening personnel 
cannot resolve the detection or encounter with Special Nuclear Material (SNM). As a 
result, the jurisdiction will contact  DNDO's Joint Analysis Center (JAC). Their activities 
are described on DNDO's website as:  
The JAC provides 24/7 capabilities to maintain situational 
awareness of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA), analyze information 
from the GNDA, law enforcement and intelligence communities. The JAC then shares the 
collected data and information with the Communities of Interest (COI) to enable the 
GNDA to become more effective, and ensure that detection leads to an appropriate 
response through the development of appropriate alarm adjudication protocols and 
facilitating the execution of those protocols. The JAC: 
• Provides technical reach-back and alarm adjudication at the 
national level 
• Develops radiological/nuclear awareness products: State Books, 
Cargo Reports 
• Provides continuous sharing of information and databases with the 






Centers, FBI, JTTF, DOE, CBP, DOS, and other U.S. government 
agencies as well as state, county and municipal law enforcement 
communities120 
As is the case with secondary screening in some jurisdictions, 
another discipline, the Department of Energy Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) 
teams or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, may handle the technical reach-back. Most 
seasoned law enforcement PRND programs, such as New York City, Philadelphia, Los 
Angeles, and Washington, DC have officers that routinely interact with the Joint Analysis 
Center on a regular basis concerning detection events. 
2. Equipment Types / Costs / Capabilities 
a. Personal Radiation Detectors 
Personal Radiation Detectors, commonly known as PRDs, form the 
backbone of law enforcement PRND programs. These small, belt-mounted detectors, 
designed to be carried by the individual patrol officer, are sometimes referred to as 
“radiation pagers” due to their size and resemblance to conventional communications 
pagers or Blackberry-like devices. They detect and reverberate in the presence of one or 
more forms of radiation alerting the officer to its presence. For the sake of this 
discussion, most will detect gamma radiation, which is the material most likely to be used 
in a “dirty bomb”, or radiological dispersal device (RDD). Some will detect neutron 
radiation, which is likely to be emitted from Special Nuclear Material (SNM) being 
employed in an IND – Improvised Nuclear Device.  
 
                                                 





Figure 3.   Personal Radiation Detector (PRD) 
Once detection is realized with a PRD, the officer will investigate and 
adjudicate the alert in accordance with their departmental protocols. This may involve 
interviewing a person, or calling for more specialized equipment used in secondary 
screening described earlier in the Mission/Task section. 
Cost per PRD can vary from $300 to $3,000 or more based on its 
functions and whether or not it can detect neutron radiation. In Appendix C, there is 
information on how to obtain NIMS Resource Typing Definitions for PRDs based on 
instrument capabilities. 
For this examination, the cost of a PRD is normalized to $1,000 with a 
$100 annual maintenance and calibration cost. The cost of training is estimated at eight 
hours at a nominal rate of $500 total. The Department of Homeland Security offers 
approved courses to educate law enforcement officers in the deployment of PRDs. 
Homeland security grant funds may be expended to receive this training. These cost 
estimates are used throughout the policy option analysis. 
b. Backpack / Portal Detection Systems 
Another primary screening tool commonly used by law enforcement 
PRND programs are radiation detection backpacks. These are essentially large PRDs 
worn on the officer in a modified backpack. There are efficient for screening large venues 
such as a sports stadium in a shorter period of time and with fewer personnel than using 




backpack is equivalent to deploying 25 PRDs. Backpacks can be removed and placed 
independently or in combination to form “portals” which pedestrians and vehicles pass 
through during screening operations. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Radiation Detection Backpack being employed as a search tool and Portal at 
2008 World Series 
Cost per Radiation Detection Backpack can vary from $20,000 to $60,000 
or more based on the available functions and whether or not it can detect neutron 
radiation. In Appendix C, there is information on how to obtain NIMS Resource Typing 
Definitions for Radiation Detection Backpacks based on instrument capabilities. There 
are some backpacks in the NIMS typing (Type I) that perform secondary screening and 
isotope identification; however, this greatly increases the cost and subsequently, they are 
not widely used.  
For this examination, the cost of a Radiation Detection Backpack is 
normalized to $45,000 with a $1,000 annual maintenance and calibration cost. The cost 
of training will be estimated at eight hours at a nominal rate of $500 total. The 




officers in the deployment of Radiation Detection Backpacks. Homeland security grant 
funds may be expended to receive this training. These cost estimates are used throughout 
the policy option analysis. 
c. Radiological Isotope Identification Devices 
Radiological Isotope Identification Devices, commonly called RIIDs, are 
secondary screening tools used to resolve detection alarms encountered by primary 
screeners using PRDs or Radiation Detection Backpacks. They collect energy emissions 
from the radioactive sources called “spectra” and the spectra are then compared to known 
samples contained in the instrument’s internal library. The simplest explanation is that 
they take a “fingerprint” of the radiation and compare it to a database of known radiation 
sources to determine what radioactive isotope is present and its likely use – medical, 
industrial, naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM), or threat (e.g., SNM). The 
higher the isotope resolution, the sharper the fingerprint, and the better the identification 
but the cost of acquisition and sustainment raises substantially.  
Cost per RIID can vary from $20,000 to $100,000 or more based on the 
isotope resolution capability, described in NIMS as low, medium, and high. In Appendix 
C, there is information on how to obtain NIMS Resource Typing Definitions for RIID's 
based on instrument capabilities and isotope resolution.  
 
 




For this examination, the cost of a RIID is normalized as $20,000 with a 
$500 annual maintenance and calibration cost. The cost of training will be estimated at 16 
hours at a nominal rate of $1,000 total. The Department of Homeland Security offers 
approved courses to educate law enforcement officers in the deployment of RIIDs. 
Homeland security grant funds may be expended to receive this training. These cost 
estimates are used throughout the policy option analysis. 
d. Mobile Systems (Vehicle, Airborne, Marine) 
Mobile systems are quite simply primary screening tools like PRDs and 
Radiation Detection Backpacks that are mounted to vehicles, aircraft, or marine vessels. 
They typically employ much larger sensors than the PRDs or backpacks and are used to 
survey larger geographical areas such as ports, neighborhoods, or cities. Most systems 
also include GPS and mapping features.  
Cost per mobile system can vary from $80,000 to $300,000 or more based 
on the functions and whether or not it can detect neutron radiation and whether it can 
perform isotope identification like a RIID. In Appendix C, there is information on how to 
obtain NIMS Resource Typing Definitions for mobile systems based on instrument 
capabilities. There are some mobile systems in the NIMS typing (Type I) that perform 
secondary screening including isotope identification, which greatly increases the cost and 






Figure 6.   Removable Mobile System and Display/Mapping Unit (Can be deployed in 
vehicle, boat, or helicopter) 
For this examination, the cost of a mobile system is normalized to 
$100,000 with a $5,000 annual maintenance and calibration cost. The cost of training will 
be estimated at eight hours at a nominal rate of $500 total. The Department of Homeland 
Security offers approved courses to educate law enforcement officers in the deployment 
of mobile systems. Homeland security grant funds may be expended to receive this 
training. These cost estimates are used throughout the policy option analysis. 
e. Summary Matrix 
Table 9 displays the costs associated with each type of equipment to 





Table 9.   Detection Equipment Matrix 













$1000 8hrs $500 $100 
Radiation Detection 
Backpack  




$20,000 16hrs $1000 $500 
Mobile Detection 
System (MDS) 





















APPENDIX C. PREVENTIVE RADIOLOGICAL NUCLEAR 
DETECTION NIMS TYPING INFORMATION 
The National Incident Management System (NIMS) resource library includes a 
dedicated treatment of Preventive Radiological / Nuclear Detection (PRND) Team 
compositions and equipment types to assist agencies measure capability against a set of 
national standards. The NIMS typing also allows for agencies to better utilize homeland 
security grant funding for implementation and sustainment of this mission. 
Unfortunately, at the time of this thesis' publication, the NIMS Typing Document 
carries the restrictive marking “FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)” and cannot be 
fully contained in this document as originally intended. 
Interested agencies can request a copy of the full NIMS typing document by 
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